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Introduction
The problem of equilibrium selection has been a relevant and fundamental topic in game theory
since the own definition of the Nash equilibrium concept. However, despite its importance, this
topic does not appear any longer as a top priority in the game-theoretic research agenda; at least,
considering the absence of relevant contributions in the last two decades. In its present state, the
existent literature consists of an eclectic collection of methods, each one dependent on a particular
methodology, or tailored merely to a specific class of problems. Hence, it becomes almost impossible
to organize those approaches under the umbrella of one or two research programs.
The current state is partially the product of the initial approach to the equilibrium multiplicity
issue; that was the equilibrium refinement research program. Its purpose was the refinement of the
equilibrium concept, seeking in the process to produce more reasonable predictions, and to reduce
the number of possible solutions in a game. However, the result was a sequence of competing
refinements and the absence of a consensual and unanimous concept. Even in extensive-form
games, where the sequential equilibrium concept is possibly the most sensible candidate, we can
find several variations that depend on the conditions for the consistency of beliefs, none of which
being entirely satisfactory. The first approach aiming at the development of rational criteria for
the selection of an equilibrium as the solution of a game emerges in the late 1980s, seen as the
culmination of the refinement program and led by two of its main contributors, John Harsanyi, and
Reinhard Selten. The subsequent interest resulted in some new methods and theories; however,
none became utterly dominant. The slowdown that followed was also the product of an emerging
paradigm, under which the information provided by the multiplicity of solutions is perhaps more
useful than the prediction/prescription of a single one.
However, in my opinion, game theory has reached a stage that justifies renewed attention over
this topic. In the one hand, the information provided by the multiplicity of solutions does not
prevent the selection of a single solution. On the other hand, the dissemination of game theoretical
tools in applied research raises the necessity for sensible predictions. Those predictions do not have
to correspond to an exact behavior code; instead, they may just have a prescriptive orientation,
matching the limitations that real agents face. The absence of such criteria limits the impact of
game-theoretical tools and raises questions as to the usefulness of the theory itself. The product of
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behavioral and experimental economics research also has increased the criticism on game theory,
based on the argument that a theory that does not make consistent and recurrent predictions
cannot be effectively useful in social sciences.
In this dissertation, I treat the selection issue with a prescriptive orientation. Therefore, I pro-
pose an equilibrium selection method to static games with complete information and an extension
of it to dynamic games with asymmetric information.
In the first paper - equilibrium selection in static games - I define criteria of risk and payoff
dominance, which I combine into a single measure. That measure - the premium of an equilibrium
- represents the risk of an equilibrium to a player, given his perception about risk, and the ex-
pected payoff. Such measure helps to rationalize the available experimental evidence by adjusting
the importance of each dominance criterion to the selection of an equilibrium according to the
characteristics of the game, namely, the distribution of the payoffs across the game outcomes. The
solution of a game is an equilibrium that minimizes the premium to the player, that is, which
minimizes the risk to a player given their perception of risk and their expected payoff, conditional
on the same being true for every opponent. I provide a brief axiomatic characterization of that
measure, and show that the solution set is nonempty and that almost all games have a unique
solution; therefore, the set of games with multiple solutions have null Lebesgue measure.
In the second paper, I extend the method to dynamic games with asymmetric information.
Considering the sequential nature of decision making, I show that a solution of an extensive-form
game does not necessarily coincide with the solution of its reduced normal-form. I apply the method
to the most basic version of Spence signaling game with just two types of worker. I obtain that the
solution of such a game depends on the firms’ prior concerning the players’ types. In both dynamic
and static games, I show that the method’s solutions respect certain invariance properties.
I am then able to identify several directions of research. In one direction, we have the application
of the selection method to specific problems in which the multiplicity of solutions play a critical role.
Among such problems, I highlight bank-runs, and climate change negotiations. Additionally, I am
interested in expanding the selection analysis of Spence game through the inclusion of additional
types of worker. Another direction follows a different path, and focus on the identification and
further characterization of the epistemic conditions of this selection method, and the comparison
with the conditions in other selection methods and/or equilibrium refinement concepts.
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Chapter 1
Equilibrium selection in static games with complete information
Rui Silva∗
April 2018
Abstract
The multiplicity of equilibria in non-cooperative games as long been a fundamental issue in
game theory. In certain cases, that situation may contribute or even improve the comprehension
of a game. However, in general, we believe that a game-theoretic analysis benefits from the
existence of rational criteria for choosing a particular sensible equilibrium as the game solution.
This topic has been the focus of two research programs; One program concerns the refine-
ment of the equilibrium concept, while the other one focuses on the criteria for the selection
of a solution. We take into consideration some of the issues that have conditioned the success
of these programs, namely in the former one, and propose a method of equilibrium selection
on static games with complete information. We propose criteria of risk and payoff dominance,
which we combine into a single measure, that we call the premium of an equilibrium. We define
a solution of a game as an admissible Nash equilibrium that conditionally minimizes the premi-
um to the players, that is, which minimizes the risk to a player, given his perception about the
risk of the equilibrium and its payoff, conditional on the same being true for every opponent.
We discuss the conditions for the uniqueness of a solution and show that in a certain class of
games, almost all have a single solution.
Keywords: equilibrium selection, risk-dominance, payoff-dominance, Nash equilibrium, equi-
librium premium, game solution.
JEL classification: C72
∗University of Milan, Via Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milan, Italy (e-mail: rui.constantino@unimi.it).
1 Introduction
The multiplicity of equilibria in non-cooperative games has long been a fundamental issue in game
theory. In certain cases, that situation may contribute to the analysis of different behaviors and
likely outcomes, and improve the understanding of the strategic problem. That is the case, for
example, in bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), climate negotiations (DeCanio & Fremstad,
2013), natural resource disputes (Madani, 2010), and geopolitical tensions and conflicts (Kuran,
1989). In those and other cases, the multiplicity of solutions is a plausible scenario; one case in
point is the decision of which side of the road to drive on, where the optimal choice depends on the
country where the player is. However, we believe that the analysis of a game, in general, benefits
from the existence of rational criteria for choosing a particular equilibrium as the game solution.
The absence of criteria that recurrently select a single sensible equilibrium not only limits the
impact of game-theoretic methods but also raises some questions about the predictive power of the
theory itself.
This issue has been the focus of two research programs. One program concerns the refinement
of the equilibrium concept, while the other one focuses on the criteria for the selection of a solution.
We start by addressing the former one, which has also been the most prominent. In static games,
we can divide it into two classes.1
One class contains equilibrium refinements which are based on the notion of outcome stability
against small perturbations of the game payoffs. Among these refinements, we highlight the notions
of essential equilibrium (Wen-Tsun & Jia-He, 1962) and regular equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1973). The
former concept selects the equilibria which have an equilibrium nearby in every neighboring game2.
The latter one represents a game outcome at which the Jacobian of a certain continuous and
differentiable mapping associated with the game is non-singular.
The second class of refinements includes concepts based on the same stability principle, but
against small perturbations on equilibrium strategies. There are many concepts to choose from,
although many of them merely follow from the weaknesses of previous refinements; hence, we
1Because this work is not built directly on any of the following concepts we omit any in-depth discussion about
their relations and distinctions. Moreover, because we restrict the scope of this work to games in strategic-form, we
leave unmentioned any refinements to extensive-form games.
2A game in which each player’s payoffs are in the neighborhood of those in the original game, which corresponds
to a point in Rn with the `∞ norm.
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just highlight three concepts. The first one is the strategic-form version of the perfect equilibrium
(Selten, 1975). This refinement selects those strategic profiles which are optimal even when a player
has a small probability of making a mistake when choosing which action to play. These equilibria are
the limit points of sequences of equilibria from games with small perturbations on the equilibrium
strategies. The second refinement concept is the proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978). It directly
refines the previous one, since it requires the small perturbations on the equilibrium strategies to
match the best-reply characteristics of the actions available to each player. The last refinement we
mention is the persistent equilibrium (Kalai & Samet, 1984). This concept can be understood as a
generalization of a strict equilibrium, aiming at reflecting the idea that stable equilibria should be
robust against small trembles in beliefs. An equilibrium is persistent if it belongs to a persistent
retract. A retract is a Cartesian product of nonempty, closed, and convex subsets of players’
actions, which include the best-replies against beliefs that are concentrated on it. Such a retract is
absorbing if small perturbations of strategic profiles in the retract have best-replies in that same
set. A retract is persistent if it is absorbing and minimal.
These refinements, independently of the class to which they belong, reduce the number of solu-
tions in many games, but not consistently down to a single one, or even to a subset of reasonable
size. These concepts are penalized by a variety of issues, such as nonexistence (essential equilibri-
um), selection of unreasonable equilibria (common to all), and non-invariance to the introduction of
strictly dominated actions (perfect and proper equilibria) or duplicate actions3 (persistent equilib-
rium). The fact that new refinements are commonly constructed on specific weaknesses of existing
ones penalizes even further this research program, contributing to what appears to be an endless
cycle of competing refinements instead of a convergent path aiming at an encompassing concept.
Set-valued theories, such as rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984) and strategic sta-
bility (Kohlberg & Mertens, 1986), have emerged partly following the limitations of the refinement
program. However, these theories, in some games, retrieve a large number of solutions. That not
only penalizes their predictive power but also prevents them from being consistent alternatives to
equilibrium refinements.
This context on the refinement program justifies the existence of an alternative program which
focuses instead on the development of rational criteria for the selection of one particular equilibrium.
3See the definition of duplicate actions on Section 2.2.
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We organize it into three branches.
The first branch includes theories and methods which view the theory of equilibrium selection
as the culmination of the equilibrium refinement program. Among those are the selection theories
from Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Harsanyi (1995). The former one is better known for the
introduction of criteria of risk and payoff dominance than for its selection method. It can be applied
to both cooperative and non-cooperative games; however, the process itself is long and complicated,
as it depends on a collection of procedures that decompose and reduce the game structure down
to a stage in which it selects a unique solution through the use of dominance criteria, a notion of
strategic distance, and the tracing procedure. However, the choice of using the tracing procedure
instead of any other mechanism of internal deliberation is rather arbitrary. Precedence is given
to payoff over risk dominance, even though the available empirical evidence does not corroborate
such a relation (see Section 4), while risk dominance comparisons follow from possible intransitive
bilateral relations. The alternative method by Harsanyi (1995) attempts to correct some of these
issues but does so by introducing new ones. The most notorious one concerns the exclusion of payoff
dominance from the set of selection criteria, a choice that, once again, does not find the necessary
support on the available empirical evidence. This decision makes the selection procedure dependent
only on the strength of an incentive measure based on risk dominance. Another problem concerns
the arbitrary decision to choose as the solution of a game when two or more equilibria are selected,
and if pre-play communication is allowed, a correlated equilibrium with a uniform distribution over
those equilibrium outcomes. If pre-play communication is not permitted, then the solution of the
game is left undefined.
The limitations of those theories, as well as their complexity and inability to provide recurrent
sensible predictions, justify the existence of alternative approaches to the selection problem; we
divide them into two branches of research. The first one includes contributions based on higher-
order beliefs, such as the theory of global games (Carlsson & Van Damme, 1993) and the concept
of p-dominance (Morris & Shin, 1995) as perhaps the most notorious examples. The second branch
includes theories that rely in evolutionary methods as a mechanism of coordination on certain
equilibrium outcomes, as in Ellison (1993), Young (1993), Kandori et al. (1993), Matsui and Mat-
suyama (1995), and Binmore and Samuelson (1997, 1999). The issue with the methods in these
two branches does not necessarily concern their predictions, but rather the complexity of some
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procedures, the difficulty to elicit some parameters, and the limited number of games to which they
can be effectively applied.
Hence, the limited success of this research program can be, in part, attributed to the absence
of consensus regarding the assumptions, criteria, and methods. Consequently, we are left with an
eclectic collection of approaches and methods, none of them being entirely successful.
In this work, we try to overcome some of these issues, while following certain principles, to
provide a sensible alternative to Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Harsanyi (1995) methods. In the
first place, we consider that our method’s predictions do not have to satisfy exogenous criteria
necessarily. Contrarily to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), which aim at satisfying the Nash product
property, we consider that any prediction should be weighted only according to the method’s own
merits. Moreover, we aim at proposing a method suitable for a broad application but which, at the
same time, possesses a reasonable level of complexity. Finally, we take into account the available
empirical evidence on the definition of the mechanism of selection; on that basis, we address the
issue concerning the trade-off between the criteria of risk and payoff dominance, which according
to experimental data, depends on the distribution of the payoffs across the game outcomes.
Given those principles, we propose an equilibrium selection method to static games with com-
plete information and a finite set of Nash equilibria. That latter assumption is made for simplifi-
cation, but we believe to be possible to successfully extend the method, under certain conditions,
to games with an infinite number of equilibria. The selection of an equilibrium depends upon a
collection of assumptions, which we introduce in Section 2; these assumptions aim at controlling for
the existence of strategically irrelevant elements in the game, guaranteeing the consistent behavior
of the method, and further characterizing a player’s rational behavior. In Section 3, we propose
criteria of risk and payoff dominance, and combine them in Section 4 into a single measure. We call
that measure the premium of an equilibrium; it represents the risk of an equilibrium to a player,
given his perception about the risk of an equilibrium and its payoff. This measure helps rational-
izing the available empirical evidence by adjusting the importance of each dominance criterion to
the selection of an equilibrium considering the characteristics of the game. We proceed with the
characterization of the process of equilibrium selection, defining it as a problem of minimization
of the premium to the players, and whose set of minimizers are the solutions of the game. We
provide an additional axiomatic characterization of a preference relation based on the premium of
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an equilibrium, and discuss the conditions for the uniqueness of a solution, showing that in a certain
class of games, almost all have a single solution. In Section 5, we summarize the main conclusions,
and point directions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The game
Consider a finite static game G with complete information in strategic-form, which has the following
elements:
◦ a finite set N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n} of players;
◦ each player i ∈ N has a nonempty finite set Ai of pure actions that he can conceivably choose
from, and a set of mixed actions ∆(Ai), such that each mixed action αi is a probability
distribution over pure actions ai ∈ Ai;
◦ the vectors of the players’ pure and mixed actions belong to the sets A := ∏i∈N Ai and
∆(A) :=
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai). With some abuse of notation, those vectors without player i’s action
belong to the sets A−i :=
∏
j 6=iAj and ∆(A−i) :=
∏
j 6=i ∆(Aj);
◦ a payoff function ui : A → R for each i ∈ N which corresponds to a von Neumann and
Morgenstern utility function.
We identify G with a strategic-form 〈N, (Ai, ui)i∈N 〉, and denote as E(G) its nonempty set of Nash
equilibria, which is finite by our assumption.
2.2 The assumptions
The process of equilibrium selection depends on a set of assumptions that aim at excluding elements
which are strategically irrelevant (Assumptions 1-3), guaranteeing consistent and reasonable results
(Assumption 4), and further characterizing the behavior of a rational player (Assumption 5). We
start with a trivial assumption concerning the players’ rationality.
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Assumption 1.
Each i ∈ N is rational; therefore, no player chooses with positive probability a strictly dominated
action4, which is common knowledge among the players. Hence, we simplify G through the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated actions whenever possible.
Intuitively, this assumption is sensible and it is commonly made in the literature; it has though an
indirect effect on the set of admissible equilibria of G, whose relevance on the process of equilibrium
selection is highlighted in Assumption 5.
To understand that effect, notice that a Nash equilibrium is admissible if no player chooses with
positive probability a weakly dominated action5. Hence, take i ∈ N , and some strictly dominated
pure action ai ∈ Ai, while assuming that such action is not necessarily chosen with null probability.
Some non-admissible Nash equilibrium α ∈ E(G) may not be considered as such if ai is the only
reason for which the equilibrium action αj := projjα is not dominated for some j 6= i, i.e., αj
unique best-reply is against ai
6. The game G0 in Figure 1 illustrates this issue.
1 0 −4
1 0 −4
0 0 −3
0 0 0
−4 0 −3
−4 −3 −3
L
U
C
M
R
D
Colin
Rowena
Figure 1: Game G0.
G0 has two admissible equilibria in pure actions, α
1 = (U, L) and α2 = (M, C); but if we eliminate
”D” and ”R”, which are strictly dominated by ”M” and ”C”, then α2 is no longer admissible.
We now proceed with two assumptions regarding the existence of duplicate elements in the game.
The first one concerns the existence of duplicate actions, while the second one the existence of
duplicate players.
4An action ai ∈ Ai is strictly dominated for i ∈ N if there is some a′i 6= ai such that, for every a−i ∈ A−i,
ui(ai, a−i) < ui(a′i, a−i).
5An action ai ∈ Ai is weakly dominated for i ∈ N if there is some a′i 6= ai such that, for every a−i ∈ A−i,
ui(ai, a−i) ≤ ui(a′i, a−i), and for aˆ−i ∈ A−i, ui(ai, aˆ−i) < ui(a′i, aˆ−i). We shall use the term dominance to denote
weak dominance
6Consider projix the projection function of the i
th coordinate of an n-dimensional vector x, such that i ≤ n.
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Assumption 2.
In G, we substitute strategically equivalent actions by a single representative action.
Two actions αi, α
′
i ∈ ∆(Ai) are strategically equivalent, which we write αi ∼ai α′i, if for every
α−i ∈ ∆(A−i) and each j ∈ N , uj(αi, α−i) = uj(α′i, α−i). We substitute them by a representative
element α¯i ∈ ∆(Ai) of an equivalence class [α¯i] =
{
αi ∈ ∆(Ai) |αi ∼ai α¯i
}
that is part of the
quotient set of ∆(Ai). If some ai ∈ Ai and αi ∈ ∆(Ai) belong to a equivalence class [α¯i], and
ai ∈ supp(αi), then αi is not eligible to represent [α¯i]7.
Assumption 3.
In G, we substitute duplicate players by a single representative player.
Players i and j are duplicates of one another if:
• for k, ` = i, j and k 6= `, if αk ∈ ∆(Ak), α`, α′` ∈ ∆(A`), and α−k−` ∈
∏
h∈N\{i,j}∆(Ah),
uk(αk, α`, α−k−`) = uk(αk, α′`, α−k−`);
• a permutation of players i and j in G produces an isomorphic game8.
In the first point, the payoffs of a duplicate player are independent of the actions of another
duplicate player. The second point implies the strategic invariance of the game to permutations
between these players. In this case, players i and j belong to an equivalence class, and we substitute
them by a unique representative player.
The next assumption aims at guaranteeing that the players’ implement a selection mechanism
that produces sensible and consistent results.
Assumption 4.
The utility function ui : X → R, with A ⊆ X, of every i ∈ N intersects in a point xo ∈ X, in
which ui(x
o) = 0. Moreover, for every i ∈ N , ui(a) ≥ 0 for each a ∈ A. Hence, the players have
interval-scale measurable payoffs with a common origin.
We characterize ui : X → R with respect to its general domain X, which is a compact subset of the
Euclidean space Rn, and includes the set A, which is the sub-domain of interest in G. In this case,
7The supp(αi) denotes the support of the probability measure αi over Ai for i ∈ N .
8We define the concept of isomorphism between games in strategic-form in Definition 8.
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each player’s payoff function ui(·) in the domain A is invariant to positive affine transformations
f : R → R, where fi(ui(a)) = ciui(a) + c′i, for scalars ci ∈ R+, c′i ∈ R, and a ∈ A. The existence of
an element xo 7→ ui(xo) = 0 for each i ∈ N implies that interval-scale measurability results from
adding a common natural origin to each ui(·), together with the idea that utilities are measurable
under a cardinal scale. This assumption comes without loss of generality since each player i has
a payoff function ui(·) that by definition is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Hence,
the common intersection at xo and the non-negativity condition can follow from a positive affine
transformation of the utility function. We show in Proposition 2 that such transformation does not
affect the selection method.
We conclude this collection of assumptions by focusing at a player’s behavior during the selection
of an equilibrium. Denote as Ai the set of admissible pure actions of player i, and as ∆(Ai) the set
of admissible mixtures. Let E be the set of admissible Nash equilibria in G, and Ai = ∆(Ai)∩projiE
the set of admissible actions that belong to an equilibrium vector in E , where A := ∏i∈N Ai. Given
these elements, we introduce an auxiliary structure to G.
Definition 1 (Auxiliary game Γ).
The strategic-form Γ =
〈
N,A, u〉 is an auxiliary game of G, where each i ∈ N only chooses with
positive probability actions in Ai; hence, player i does not randomize.
The set of Nash equilibria in Γ is E(Γ), such that E ⊆ E(Γ). However, because the solution of G
has to be an equilibrium in it, only the equilibria in E are eligible for selection. We now complete
the set of assumptions.
Assumption 5.
In G, each i ∈ N uses a selection mechanism si : Γ ⇒ E, such that, si(Γ) is the set of equilibria
selected by player i.9
Each i ∈ N uses a selection mechanism si(·) to select one or more equilibria in E . A comment is yet
necessary as to the restriction to the set A during the selection process. As a first step, it is sensible
to start by considering the set Ai instead of the entire set Ai for every i ∈ N . That assumption is
made, for instance, in Luce and Raiffa (1957) characterization of decision-making under uncertainty,
9As a simplification, when we say that i ∈ N chooses or selects α ∈ E , we mean that player i chooses an
equilibrium action αi := projiα, considering that every j 6= i chooses an equilibrium action αj := projjα.
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and in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) definition of the concept of strategic stability. But since we
aim at making predictions that can be feasibly implementable by real people in real problems of
strategic interaction, we do not consider sensible to select an equilibrium in G using the entire set
∆(Ai); we take instead A a more reasonable domain of selection. The intuition is the following.
Take α ∈ E , and consider a deviation by player i from the equilibrium action αi := projiα to some
α′i 6= αi. Assume that α′i belongs to some other equilibrium vector. In this case, player i considers
a deviation to α′i with positive probability if such action is a best-reply to the best-reply action α
′
j
by every j 6= i to his initial deviation from αi. Hence, we aim at reflecting the players’ preference
for equilibrium stability (i.e., that the outcome of the game is a Nash equilibrium), even when a
player deviates from some equilibrium outcome.
3 Selection criteria
In this section, we propose and characterize criteria of risk and payoff dominance which are at
the core of the method of equilibrium selection. We accompany their characterization of examples
based on game G1 in Figure 2. In Section 4, we provide some additional examples that highlight
other features of the selection method.
5 1
8 4
2 4
5 7
L R
U
D
Colin
Rowena
Figure 2: The game G1.
G1 is a generic game with complete information and the following admissible Nash equilibria: two
equilibria in pure actions, aˆ = (U, L) and a˜ = (D, R); and one equilibrium in mixed actions,
α =
(
1/3[U] + 2/3[D], 1/2[L] + 1/2[R]
)
.
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3.1 Risk Dominance
We propose a criterion of risk-dominance that possesses some differences in comparison to Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) version. For that reason, we believe to be necessary to comment on the moti-
vation to follow a different route. In essence, both criteria share a similar intuition; the risk of an
equilibrium depends on the losses following the players’ unilaterally deviation from an equilibrium
action. In Harsanyi and Selten (1988), that leads to a risk-dominance criterion based on pairwise
comparisons. However, in games larger than 2 × 2 that relation is not necessarily transitive. To
overcome that issue, they define, for such games, the risk criterion using the tracing procedure;
that is a method of internal deliberation that transforms the players’ prior beliefs into equilibrium
choices. In that case, the method is significantly more complex. Moreover, the outcome of the trac-
ing procedure depends on the prior chosen. The authors obtain that prior following the principle
of insufficient reason10; but that option is not sensible in many cases. The entire definition of the
criterion is also not objective, since there is no apparent reason for preferring the tracing procedure
over any other method of internal deliberation. In comparison, our risk-dominance criterion allows
for transitive comparisons between the equilibria; it possesses a reasonable level of complexity, and
its arguments are elicitable, which should allow the empirical validation of its predictions, even on
games larger than 2× 2.
In the characterization of both dominance criteria, write an admissible Nash equilibrium α ∈ E ,
henceforth just equilibrium, as α = (αi, α−i). Let α−i = (αj)j 6=i, where αj = projj α for every
j 6= i. We thus begin the characterization of the criterion of risk-dominance with the definition of
the concept of best-deviation from an equilibrium action αi by player i.
Definition 2 (Best-deviation).
The best-deviation by player i from an equilibrium action αi in α ∈ E is an action α1i ∈ Ai\{αi},
such that, for every α′i ∈ Ai\{αi, α1i },
ui(αi, α−i) ≥ ui(α1i , α−i) ≥ ui(α′i, α−i).
10The principle stating that in ignorance about the likelihood of some collection of events, each event is equally
likely to take place.
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This best-deviation induces a relative utility loss λα(α
1
i ), where
λα(α
1
i ) =
ui(αi, α−i)− ui(α1i , α−i)
ui(αi, α−i)− ui(xo) . (1)
A best-deviation α1i from an equilibrium action αi represents for player i his second best-reply
against the equilibrium actions α−i of every j 6= i. The relative utility loss λi(·) is computed with
reference to ui(x
o) to guarantee the invariance of the ratio to an isomorphism of G (see Definition
8). That property, as we discuss later, ensures that the selection method can adequately reflect
potential symmetries between elements of G. We now generalize the concept of best-deviation.
Definition 3 (Best-deviation generalization).
Let |Ai\{αi}| = mi and mi > 1; the 2nd best-deviation from an equilibrium action αi in α ∈ E is
an action α2i ∈ Ai\{αi, α1i }, such that, for every α′i ∈ Ai\{αi, α1i , α2i },
ui(α
2
i , α−i) ≥ ui(α′i, α−i),
and such deviation induces a relative utility loss λα(α
2
i ), where
λα(α
2
i ) =
ui(αi, α−i)− ui(α2i , α−i)
ui(αi, α−i)− ui(xo) . (2)
By induction, the `th best-deviation by player i from the equilibrium action αi is an action α
`
i ∈
Ai\{αi} ∪ {αki }`−1k=1, such that, for every α′i ∈ Ai\{αi} ∪ {αki }`k=1,
ui(α
`
i , α−i) ≥ ui(α′i, α−i),
and such deviation induces a relative utility loss λα(α
`
i), where
λα(α
`
i) =
ui(αi, α−i)− ui(α`i , α−i)
ui(αi, α−i)− ui(xo) . (3)
If Ai\{αi} ∪ {αki }`k=1 = ∅, then ` = mi, and player i has no more available deviations.
We now illustrate the previous concepts in the following example.
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Example 1.
Consider the auxiliary game Γ1 of G1 in Figure 3.
5 1 3
8 4 6
2 4 3
5 7 6
3 3 3
6 6 6
L
U
R
D
1/2[L] + 1/2[R]
1/3[U] + 2/3[D]
Colin
Rowena
Figure 3: The auxiliary game Γ1 of G1.
In Table 1, we identify Rowena and Colin’s best-deviations and relative utility losses from each
equilibrium. Write an equilibrium as α = (αr, αc), where αr stands for Rowena’s action, and αr
for Colin’s action.
Rowena Colin
α1r λ(·)(α
1
r) α
2
r λ(·)(α
2
r) α
1
c λ(·)(α
1
c) α
2
c λ(·)(α
2
c)
aˆ αr .25 D .375 αc .4 R .8
a˜ αr .143 U .429 αc .25 L .5
α U 0 D 0 L 0 R 0
Table 1: Best-deviations and relative utility losses.
We read those results as follows. At the pure equilibrium aˆ, Rowena’s best deviation is to αr =
1/3[U ] + 2/3[D], which implies a relative loss of .25 of her expected utility in equilibrium. Notice
that in the mixed equilibrium α, both players are indifferent between a deviation to any of their
admissible pure actions, since none leads to a loss in the expected utility. I
Denote now as δi(α) =
{
αki
}mi
k=1
the set of all possible deviations by player i from α ∈ E . Write the
collection of all deviations from α ∈ E by every i ∈ N as,
δ(α) =
⋃
i∈N
δi(α).
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With some abuse of notation, denote that collection without player i’s best deviations as,
δ−i(α) =
⋃
j 6=i
δj(α).
Let P
(
δ−i(α)
)
be the collection of all possible combinations of the deviations in δ−i(α), which
satisfies the following conditions:
a) for every set δ¯(α) ∈ P(δ−i(α)), let |δ¯(α) ∩ δi(α)| ∈ {0, 1} and 0 < |δ¯(α)| ≤ n, such that
δ−i(α) /∈ P
(
δ−i(α)
)
;
b) P
(
δ−i(α)
) ⊂P(δ−i(α)), where P(δ−i(α)) is the power set of δ−i(α).
Condition a) implies that each combination of deviations δ¯(α) from α ∈ E is nonempty and includes,
at the most, one deviation per player. In the case that some player deviates for several times from
an equilibrium, each of those deviations belong to a different vector of deviations. Condition b)
means that P
(
δ−i(α)
)
has a strict inclusion in the power set of δ−i(α). We then define a function,
ri : P
(
δ−i(α)
)→ [0, 1], (4)
such that, for any δ¯(α) ∈ P(δ−i(α)),
δ¯(α) 7→ ri
(
δ¯(α)
)
=
∏
j 6=i
λα(α
k
j ), ∀αkj ∈ δ¯(α), (5)
where λα(α
k
j ) is the relative utility loss of a deviation α
k
j ∈ δ¯(α) by j 6= i from α ∈ E .
For some δ¯(α) ∈ P(δ−i(α)) and α ∈ E , when ri(δ¯(α)) is close to zero, the likelihood of δ¯(α)
taking place in G is high, and so is the risk of the equilibrium α to player i. Hence, the combination
of deviations in P
(
δ−i(α)
)
with the lowest ri(·) sets the highest risk of the equilibrium α to player
i; we call it the risk of degree 1.
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Definition 4 (Risk of degree 1).
The risk of degree 1 of an equilibrium to i ∈ N is a function ρ1i : E → [0, 1], such that, at α ∈ E,
ρ1i (α) =

1− ri
(
δ¯(α)
)
, for ri
(
δ¯(α)
) ≤ ri(δ¯′(α)) and ∀δ¯′(α) ∈ P(δ−i(α))
0, if P
(
δ−i(α)
)
= ∅.
(6)
A set δ¯(α) ∈ P(δ−i(α)) containing the deviations of bigger number of players sets, in general, lower
degrees of risk; hence, the risk that these deviations induce to player i is small. The intuition is that
simultaneous unilateral deviations of multiple players are, in principle, less likely than, for example,
the unilateral deviation of a single one. However, it is trivial to verify that a degree of risk is not
necessarily monotonic in the number of simultaneous unilateral deviations. We now generalize the
concept of degree of risk.
Definition 5 (Risk of degree k).
Let m¯ = maxi∈N |P
(
δ−i(α)
)|; the risk of degree k of an equilibrium to i ∈ N is a function ρki : E →
[0, 1], with k ≤ m¯, such that, at α ∈ E,
ρki (α) =

1− ri
(
δ¯′′(α)
)
, for ri
(
δ¯′′(α)
) ≤ ri(δ¯′(α)) and ∀δ¯′(α) ∈ P(δ−i(α))\{δ¯`(α)}k−1`=1
0, if P
(
δ−i(α)
)\{δ¯`(α)}k−1
`=1
= ∅.
(7)
Every i ∈ N associates m¯ degrees of risk to each α ∈ E , albeit the dimension of each Ai is not the
same. In that way, we keep the coherence between the number of degrees of risk of each equilibrium
to every player. We now aggregate the degrees of risk of α ∈ E to player i into a unique measure,
which is simultaneously the cornerstone for the criterion of risk-dominance.
Definition 6 (Risk).
The risk of an equilibrium for i ∈ N is a function ρi : E → R, such that, at α ∈ E,
ρi(α) =
m¯∑
j=1
ηji (α)ρ
j
i (α). (8)
Each weight ηji (α) ∈ [0, 1] is an element of a finite monotonic weakly decreasing sequence ηi(α) =
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{
ηki (α)
}m¯
k=1
, such that, for j 6= k,
ηji (α) = 1−
∑
k∈{1,...,m¯}\j
ηki (α), and η
k
i (α) =
ρki (α)
ρji (α)
ηji (α), (9)
and
m¯∑
`=1
η`i (α) = 1. (10)
The function ρi(·) unifies the degrees of risk of an equilibrium α to player i. Because each degree
of risk is not necessarily equally relevant, its contribution for the risk has a weight; the collection
of such weights represents a vector of dimension m¯. Using ρi(·), we can now compare, at the player
level, the equilibria in E .
Definition 7 (Risk-dominance).
Each i ∈ N has a binary relation %ρi , which we call a risk-dominance relation, over E, such that,
for any α′, α′′ ∈ E, α′ risk dominates α′′, which we write α′ ρi α′′, if ρi(α′) ≤ ρi(α′′).
We conclude the following about the risk-dominance relation %ρi .
Proposition 1.
%ρi is a preference relation.
In the next example, we compare the admissible equilibria of G1 using %ρi .
Example 2.
We depict in Table 2 the degrees of risk and weights of each equilibrium of G1 to each player.
Rowena Colin
ρ1r(·) ρ2r(·) η1r(·) η2r(·) ρ1c(·) ρ2c(·) η1c (·) η2c (·)
aˆ 0.6 0.2 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.625 0.545 0.454
a˜ 0.75 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.857 0.571 0.6 0.4
α 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5
Table 2: Degrees of risk and respective weights of each admissible equilibrium in G1.
Considering Definition 6: for Rowena, we have ρr(aˆ) = 0.5, ρr(a˜) = 0.65, and ρr(α) = 1; and for
Colin, we have ρc(aˆ) ≈ 0.693, ρc(a˜) ≈ 0.743, and ρc(α) = 1. Hence, Rowena’s risk-dominance
preferences are aˆ %ρr a˜ %ρr α, and Colin’s are aˆ %ρc a˜ %ρc α. I
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We conclude the characterization of %ρi by addressing the effect on it of symmetries between some
elements of G; therefore, we check for its invariance to an isomorphism of the strategic-form of G.
We start with the definition of that concept following the definition in Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
Definition 8 (Isomorphism of the strategic-form).
An isomorphism between two strategic-form games G =
〈
N, (Ai, ui)i∈N
〉
and G˜ =
〈
N˜ , (A˜i, u˜i)i∈N˜
〉
is a bijection T : G→ G˜ which satisfy the following conditions:
1. There exists a bijection t : N → N˜ ;
2. There exists a bijection ti : Ai → A˜t(i) for every i ∈ N ;
3. ut(i)
(
t(a)
)
= θiui(a) + ϑi, for every i ∈ N and a ∈ A, where θi > 0 and ϑi ∈ R.
Conditions 1 and 2 imply the mapping of player i’s actions in Ai in G onto the actions in t(At(i)))
of player t(i) in G˜. In condition 3, the payoff ut(i)(t(a)) of any t(a) ∈ t(A) :=
∏
t(i)∈N˜ t(At(i)) to a
player t(i) in G˜ is a positive affine transformation of ui(a) of any a ∈ A to i ∈ N in G; hence, the
preferences of the latter player are preserved. When θi = 1 and ϑi = 0, the isomorphism T just
renames the players in N and actions in Ai for each i ∈ N . The following result states the desired
invariance property of %ρi .
Proposition 2.
Let T be an isomorphism between G =
〈
N, (Ai, ui)i∈N
〉
and G˜ =
〈
N˜ , (A˜i, u˜i)i∈N˜
〉
. For any α, α′ ∈
E , let α %ρi α′ in G. Hence, t(α) %ρt(i) t(α′) in G˜.
3.2 Payoff Dominance
We define the criterion of payoff dominance considering the weight of an equilibrium payoff to
player i on the sum of all the equilibrium payoffs to him in G.
Definition 9 (Weight of an equilibrium payoff).
The weight of the payoff of an equilibrium to i ∈ N is a function wi : E → R, such that, at α ∈ E,
wi(α) =
ui(α)− ui(xo)∑
α′∈E
(
ui(α′)− ui(xo)
)
+ 1
. (11)
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We can now compare the equilibria in E from a payoff perspective at the player level, while using
the same unit of measure as in risk-dominance. As in the previous dominance criterion, we define
a binary relation over E .
Definition 10 (Payoff-dominance).
Each i ∈ N has a binary relation %ui , which we call a payoff-dominance relation, over E, such that,
for any α′, α′′ ∈ E, α′ payoff dominates α′′, which we write α′ %ui α′′, if wi(α′) ≥ wi(α′′).
The payoff-dominance criterion %ui is a preference relation. Such follows from %ui being induced
by a measure wi(·), whose range just contains utility factors of player i on the unit interval. In the
next example, we compare once again the admissible equilibria of G1, this time using the criterion
of payoff-dominance.
Example 3.
We depict in Table 3 the equilibrium payoff weights of the equilibria of G1.
aˆ a˜ α
wr 0.381 0.333 0.286
wc 0.417 0.333 0.25
Table 3: Equilibrium payoff weights in the game G1.
According to the criterion of payoff-dominance, Rowena’s preferences are aˆ ur a˜ ur α, and Colin’s
are aˆ uc a˜ uc α. I
Before introducing to the equilibrium selection mechanism, we make one remark.
Remark 1.
Consider an admissible pure equilibrium a and mixed equilibrium α. Suppose that, for every i ∈ N ,
wi(a) = wi(α), ρi(a) = ρi(α), and ρ
k
i (a) = ρ
k
i (α) for every k ≤ m¯; additionally, let supp(αi)∩ai 6= ∅,
where ai = projia. In that case, only a is eligible for selection since not only is action a a limiting
strategy of α, but because the players are indifferent between each equilibrium with respect to the
selection criteria, these outcomes are, in some sense, duplicates of one another; hence, the presence
of both bias the results by duplicating the best-deviations from the admissible equilibria. In that
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case, both a and α belong to an equivalence class [a¯] = {α ∈ E|wi(a¯) = wi(α), ρi(a¯) = ρi(α), ρki (a¯) =
ρki (α),∀k ≤ m¯,∀i ∈ N}, which is represented by a; hence, only the latter equilibrium is eligible for
selection, since for every ai := projia, ai ∈ supp(αi), where αi := projiα, that is, α depends on the
equilibrium actions in a, but not the contrary.
4 Equilibrium selection
4.1 Selection mechanism
One question that arises from Harsanyi and Selten (1988) method, and which is neglected afterwards
in Harsanyi (1995), concerns the proper manner, if there is any, to trade-off the criteria of risk and
payoff dominance. Several empirical works provide some insight on this issue. In general, they
support the idea that a player’s choice between playing one of multiple possible Nash equilibria
takes into account both the criteria of risk and payoff dominance. However, their relative importance
in the selection process depends on the characteristics of the game, namely, the distribution of the
payoffs across the different game outcomes. We summarize the trade-off mechanism as follows.
On the one hand, the criterion of payoff-dominance is the more relevant one when comparing
two equilibria, in the sense that the equilibrium which players prefer is payoff-dominant, whenever
the difference between the risk of those equilibria falls below some threshold, and the difference
between their respective payoffs is high enough. Such idea is supported by Friedman (1996), who
shows that the payoff-dominant equilibrium is played more often as the difference between the
equilibrium payoffs increase, and their risk is kept fixed. It is also backed by Battalio, Samuelson,
and Van Huyck (2001), that on experiments using stag-hunt games obtain that as the difference
between the risk of two equilibria decreases, the play of the Pareto dominant one becomes more
frequent, and by Schmidt et al. (2003) and Fe´vrier and Linnemer (2006), the former in experiments
with stag-hunt games, and the latter through the analysis of the TV contest ”the weakest link”.
On the other hand, the conditions under which the criterion of risk-dominance is the more rele-
vant one in such comparison, as one would expect, are the opposite of those that we describe above.
We notice that the experimental evidence by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990, 1991), Cooper
et al. (1990), and Straub (1995) point to the fact that players, even if not entirely behaviorally
oriented to the selection of the risk-dominant equilibrium in some game, follow the recommenda-
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tions of that criterion more often than those prescribed by the criterion of payoff-dominance. One
possible interpretation of those results is that the necessary differences between the risk and the
payoff of the equilibria under comparison, which would allow the selection of the payoff dominant
outcome, are rather strict and frequently not met.
We conclude, from the empirical evidence, that there is a trade-off between the dominance
criteria on a player’s decision to play a specific equilibrium action. Contrarily to Harsanyi (1995),
we should not assume that risk-dominance is the only criterion taken into consideration by a player
when comparing multiple equilibria; not even that such criterion always determines the solution of
a game.
Hence, we characterize player i’s process of evaluation of an equilibrium as a combination of
its risk and the weight of its payoff, together with his perception about its risk. The player’s
perception of the risk brings some behavioral content to the selection analysis, and arises from the
non-linear trade-off between the dominance criteria on the experiments above. It represents either
the incorrect computation of the risk following, for instance, a sporadic mistake, or a bias or a
over/underestimation of the true risk of an equilibrium. Given the possible large dimension of the
sets of actions and equilibria, and the operations to perform, we find this approach sensible.
Therefore, we combine the risk and payoff characteristics of an equilibrium into a single measure,
which we call the premium of an equilibrium.
Definition 11 (Premium).
The premium of an equilibrium to player i is a function pii : E → R, such that, at α ∈ E we have,
pii(α) =
1
1 + wi(α)
fi
(
1 + ρi(α)
)
. (12)
The function fi : [0,∞)→ [1,∞) is increasing, continuous, and either:
(i) convex, with a slope greater or equal than one in its entire domain;
(ii) concave, with a slope less or equal than one in its entire domain;
(iii) linear, with a slope equal to one in its entire domain,
and it represents the player’s perception of the risk of an equilibrium.
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The premium pii(α) of α ∈ E to player i represents the risk ρi(α) from playing an equilibrium
action αi := projiα, given his perception fi(·), and the weight of its equilibrium payoff wi(α). We
assume that player i’s function fi(·) is the same in the evaluation of each α ∈ E . However, it may
be reasonable to assume that, in some occasions, the player have different functions describing his
perception about the risk of different subsets of equilibria. We stick with the first assumption for
simplification and to minimize the notation, since it does not affect any of the results. Hence, let
f(·) = (fi(·))i∈N be the profile of functions describing the players’ perception of the risk of an
equilibrium, which is common to every equilibrium in E .
The premium pii(·) helps rationalizing some of the available empirical literature. To understand
that, take some i ∈ N , and α, α′ ∈ E , such that ρi(α) ≤ ρi(α′) with |ρi(α) − ρi(α′)| ≤ φ, and
wi(α) ≥ wi(α′) where |wi(α) − wi(α′)| ≥ ψ. For some φ ≤ φ¯ and ψ ≥ ψ¯, the criterion of payoff-
dominance is the more relevant one, and we select α. Otherwise, it is the risk-dominance criterion
the main one, and we select α′.
The function fi(·), which describes player i’s perception of the risk of an equilibrium, has one
of three general forms, each characterizing a different type of perception:
(i) It is convex with a slope greater or equal than one in its entire domain when player i’s
perception overweight the risk ρi(α) of α ∈ E in its premium pii(α). We say that player i
aggravates his perception of the risk if such is then represented by a convex function f ′i(·),
in which Df ′i(·) > Dfi(·) in the entire domain [0,+∞), where D is a differential operator,
such that, pii,f (α) ≤ pii,f ′(α) for every α ∈ E , where pii,f (α), pii,f ′(α) are the premia of α when
player i’s perception is given by fi(·) and f ′i(·);
(ii) It is concave with a slope less or equal than one in its entire domain when player i’s perception
underweight the risk ρi(α) of α ∈ E in its premium pii(α). We say that player i improves his
perception of the risk of an equilibrium if such is then represented by a concave function f ′i(·),
with Df ′i(·) < Dfi(·) in the domain [0,+∞), such that pii,f (α) ≥ pii,f ′(α) for every α ∈ E ,
where pii,f (α), pii,f ′(α) are the premia of α when player i’s perception is given by fi(·) and
f ′i(·);
(iii) It is linear with constant slope equal to one in its entire domain when a player has a neutral
perception of the risk of an equilibrium.
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We define the process of equilibrium selection by each i ∈ N as a minimization problem of the
premium pii(·) from choosing an equilibrium action αi := projiα belonging to α ∈ E when every
j 6= i plays an equilibrium action αj := projjα, such that,
min
α∈E
pii(α)
s.t. τi(pii(α
′)) +
∑
j 6=i
τj(pij(α
′)) ≥ τi(pii(α)) +
∑
j 6=i
τj(pij(α)), ∀α′ ∈ E ,
pii(α) ≥ 0, ∀α ∈ E .
(13)
Each i ∈ N chooses α ∈ E with the minimum premium pii(α) among every equilibrium in E ; hence,
if every j 6= i plays that equilibrium, any deviation by i from α to some α′ ∈ E cannot improve,
and possibly worsens, the premium to at least one j 6= i, i.e., pij(α) ≤ pij(α′). If that latter relation
holds in inequality, then α′ is not a self-enforcing selection; player j has, in that case, an incentive
to deviate from α′ by playing αj := projjα, hence enforcing the selection of α. Therefore, the
solutions of the problem for player i are the equilibria in which him and the remaining n−1 players
coordinate on, as he cannot enforce the coordination in one other equilibrium without penalizing
the premium to some j 6= i.
In this problem, τi : [0, y) → [0,∞) is a concave function, where τi(x) = 0 in x ∈ {0, y}, with
y ∈ (0,∞), and Dτi(x) = 0 in some unique point x∗ ∈ (0, y). This function represents a no dictator
condition in the selection problem. A dictator is some j ∈ N who can determine the selection of
his preferred (with respect to the premium) equilibrium α′ ∈ E over some α 6= α′, independently of
the preferences of every other i 6= j. In the absence of τi(·), player j would have a set of functions
Fj describing his perception about the risk of an equilibrium, under which,
pij(α
′)− pij(α) >
∑
i 6=j
pii(α
′)− pii(α). (14)
The domain of τi(·) is semi-open to guarantee that the contribution of the premium pii(·) to player
i in the aggregate premium pi(·) is strictly positive for any pii(·) > 0.
Because each i ∈ N faces the minimization problem in Equation (13), there are n minimization
problems of the premium of an equilibrium. However, we can then just focus on the common
restriction of each of those problems; hence, we can write the selection problem from a global
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perspective as,
min
α∈E
∑
i∈N
τi(pii(α)).
s.t. τi(pii(α)) ≥ 0, ∀α ∈ E ,∀i ∈ N.
(15)
We can verify that the solution of this problem simultaneously solves each of the n individual
minimization problems as defined in Equation (13); therefore, we can just analyze the selection
problem under this setup. For simplification, we write
pi(α) =
∑
i∈N
τi(pii(α)), (16)
and call it the aggregate premium of α ∈ E . Thus, we have that the solutions to the problem in
Equation (15) are the equilibria we select as the solutions of G.
Definition 12 (Solution).
The arg minα∈E pi(α) = s are the solutions of G, where s =
∏
i∈N si. We call α ∈ s a solution of G.
It is trivial to prove that s is a nonempty set; hence, there is always at least one solution on G. We
can now use pi(·) to order E .
Definition 13 (Global preferences).
There is a binary relation %pi over E, such that, for any α′, α′′ ∈ E, α′ is globally preferred to α′′,
which we write α′ %pi α′′, if pi(α′) ≤ pi(α′′).
Consequently, we obtain the following result regarding %pi.
Proposition 3.
The relation %pi is a total order over E.
The proof is trivial. Since the risk ρi(·) of an equilibrium in E to each i ∈ N and the weight wi(·) of
its payoff induce preference relations, then %pi is at least a partial order. Because the set E is finite,
and every equilibrium induces a well-defined aggregate premium pi(·), every admissible equilibrium
is comparable, consequently satisfying the trichotomy law. We add the following remark.
Remark 2.
If there is only one i ∈ N in G for which |Ai| > 1, then this player decides the solution of the game
based on the equilibria that maximizes his expected payoff ui(·).
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We complete the characterization of the selection process with two examples. In the first one, we
just conclude the process of equilibrium selection on G1.
Example 4.
In Table 4, we identify the premium of the equilibria of G1. For simplification, we assume that
Rowena and Colin have a neutral perception of the risk of an equilibrium, such that fi(·) = (·),
where i = r stands for Rowena, and i = c for Colin.
aˆ a˜ α
pir 1.086 1.238 1.555
pic 1.195 1.307 1.6
pi 2.281 2.544 3.155
Table 4: The premium of every equilibrium in G1.
The global preferences over the equilibria of G1 are aˆ pi a˜ pi α. Hence, aˆ is its unique solution. I
In the second example, we analyze three versions of the stag-hunt game, similar to those used in
the experiments of Battalio et al. (2001). We show that the trade-off between the criteria of risk
and payoff dominance depends on the characteristics of the game, namely, the distribution of the
payoffs across the game outcomes; hence, it supports the claim that our method contributes to the
rationalization of some of the available empirical evidence on equilibrium selection.
Example 5.
Consider three versions of a stag-hunt game in Figure 4. Games G3 and G4 (center and right-hand
side, respectively) are variations of the game G2 (left-hand side) regarding the distribution of the
payoffs; the best-reply correspondence is, nonetheless, the same in all three games.
70 55
70 1
1 20
55 20
S H
S
H
Colin
Rowena
70 55
70 1
1 10
55 10
S H
S
H
Colin
70 55
70 8
8 20
55 20
S H
S
H
Colin
Figure 4: Original game G2 (left-hand side), first variation G3 (middle), and second variation G4 (right-hand side).
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These games have the following admissible Nash equilibria: two equilibria in pure actions, a = (S, S)
and a′ = (H,H); and one equilibrium in mixed actions, which is α =
(
19/34[S]+15/34[H], 19/34[S]+
15/34[H]
)
in G2, α =
(
3/8[S] + 5/8[H], 3/8[S] + 5/8[H]
)
in G3, and α =
(
4/9[S] + 5/9[H], 4/9[S] +
5/9[H]
)
in G4. Because these games are symmetric, when both players have the same perception
of the risk of an equilibrium, we can focus on the selection problem of one player. For simplicity,
we assume that this is the case, and set fi(·) = (·)2 for Rowena (i = r) and Colin (i = c).
Game G2: The equilibrium a
′ risk dominates the other two equilibria since ρr(a′) ≈ 0.429, while
ρr(a) ≈ 0.850 and ρr(α) = 1; however, the equilibrium a is payoff dominant. In this case, risk-
dominance determines the equilibrium chosen, as it is corroborated by the premia, since pir(a) ≈
2.222, pir(a
′) ≈ 1.768, and pir(α) ≈ 3.064. Hence, a′ is the solution of G2.
Game G3: This is a variation of G2, where the payoff of (H,H) is reduced from 20 down to 10.
In this case, ρr(a
′) increases to approximately .589, and the difference between the weight of the
equilibrium payoffs is larger. Hence, payoff-dominance now determines the equilibrium chosen, as
reflected in the premia, since pir(a) ≈ 2.019 and pir(a′) ≈ 2.308. Thus, a is the solution of G3.
Game G4: This is another variation of G2, where the risk of both pure equilibria increase, though in
a larger proportion on a′. The equilibrium a is the solution since pir(a) ≈ 2.164 and pir(a′) ≈ 2.252.
However, the necessary variation in the risk of a′ to allow this result is larger than in G3, since
the change in the premium of the equilibria in G3 is also due to a change in the weight of their
payoffs. I
We conclude this subsection with an additional but brief axiomatic characterization of %pi. We
call it additional since %pi takes into account the assumptions made in Section 2; in this case, the
addition of the axioms below intends to highlight some properties of %pi.
Let G be the collection of all static games with complete information and a finite set of admissible
Nash equilibria. For any G ∈ G with a set of equilibria E , consider a generic binary relation
%⊆ E × E .
Axiom 1.
If T is an isomorphism between G,G′ ∈ G, for α, α′ ∈ E , if α % α′ in G, then T (α) % T (α′) in G′.
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This axiom just extends the analysis of the effects of a game isomorphism beyond the sphere of
risk-dominance. As for the next axiom, let a ∈ E be a pure equilibrium; take G′ ∈ G, where
G′ =
〈
N,A, u′〉, such that, for every α ∈ E \{a}, u′i(α) = ui(α), and u′i(a) = ui(a) + bi, where
bi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N , and bj > 0 for at least one j ∈ N . In this case, we say that G′ is generated
from G by the strengthening of a ∈ E . If s is the solution of G and s′ the solution of G′, and if
s′ ⊆ s, we say that s is payoff monotonous.
Axiom 2.
If G′ is a game generated from G by the strengthening of a ∈ E , and for α ∈ E \{a}, a % α in G,
then a  α in G′.
This is an appealing axiom since it is reasonable to assume that an equilibrium should not be less
attractive to the players if its payoff is not worse to any of them, and it is strictly better for at
least one of them. We can accompany this axiom with an extension by considering that G′ can be
a game generated from G by weakening a ∈ A, while keeping the same best-reply correspondence,
such that, for every α ∈ A\{a}, u′i(α) = ui(α), and u′i(a) = ui(a)+bi, where bi ≤ 0 for every i ∈ N ,
and bj > 0 for at least one j ∈ N .
Axiom 2′.
Let α′, α′′ ∈ E ; if G′ is a game generated from G by the weakening of a ∈ A, where ai = projia
and aj = projja for every j 6= i, such that, aj ∈ supp(α′j), for α′j = projjα′, but ai /∈ supp(α′i), if
α′ % α′′ in G, then α′  α′′ in G′.
It means that if at least one player has more to lose following a deviation from an equilibrium
action, while the remaining players suffer the same losses as before, then it is sensible to assume
that an equilibrium is not less appealing than before. We conclude this collection of axioms with
the following one.
Axiom 3.
Let α, α′, α′′ ∈ E ; for every i ∈ N , if α %ρi α′ %ρi α′′ and α′ %ui α %ui α′′, then α′′ /∈ s in G.
This axiom just implies that players’ have a strict preference for the minimization of the risk and
the maximization of their payoff when they coordinate in one or more equilibria. Considering these
axioms, we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 4.
%pi satisfies Axioms 1,2,2′, and 3 in any G ∈ G.
Naturally, %pi is unique up to a positive affine transformation of pi(·) or to a positive monotonic
transformation of either ρi(·) or wi(·), or both, in pii(·) for every i ∈ N . It is also clear that %pi
would satisfy the axioms above if for every i ∈ N , pii(·) would be the result of the addition of ρi(·)
with wi(·) instead of a ratio. However, we consider the latter form more sensible, since it is more
sensitive to changes in each of those measures, and because it has a straight intuitive interpretation;
it represents to a player the risk of an equilibrium weighted by its payoff. In the case of the addition,
an interpretation is not immediate or even clear.
4.2 Uniqueness of a solution
We now discuss some of the conditions for the existence of a unique solution in G. We start by
providing an example of a well-known game with multiple solutions.
Example 6.
Consider the game of the battle of the sexes in Figure 5. This game has two equilibria in pure action-
s, a = (B,B) and a′ = (S, S), and one equilibrium in mixed actions, α =
(
2/3[B]+1/3[S]; 1/3[B]+
2/3[S]
)
. We assume that players have the same perception of the risk of an equilibrium, such that
fi(·) = (·)2 for both Rowena (i = r) and Colin’s (i = c).
2 1
3 1
1 3
1 2
B S
B
S
Colin
Rowena
Figure 5: The battle of the sexes.
We obtain that pi(a) = pi(a′) ≈ 3.835, and pi(α) = 6.4. Hence, this game has two solutions. This
result, albeit not a unique solution, is intuitively sensible due to the exclusion of an equilibrium
that both players dislike concerning its risk and payoff characteristics. I
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Considering this example, we can anticipate that, under certain conditions, we may obtain a unique
solution in the battle of the sexes. To verify that, consider an alternative version of Example 6.
Example 7.
Consider again the game of the battle of the sexes in Figure 5. Assume that Rowena’s perception
of the risk of an equilibrium is given by fr(·) = (·)2, but that Colin’s perception is now represented
by a linear function fc(·) = (·). In this case, pi(a) ≈ 2.855, and pi(a′) ≈ 3.345. Hence, although the
game is symmetric, by inducing asymmetry in the players’ perception of the risk of an equilibrium,
we break down the multiplicity of solutions, and select a as the unique solution of the game. I
Therefore, the uniqueness or multiplicity of solutions in G depends, on the last instance, on the
profile f = (fi(·)) that describes the players’ perception of the risk of the equilibria in E .
Denote as Fi the set of all functions fi(·) that can describe player i’s perception of the risk of an
equilibrium; without any additional restriction, let Fi = Fj for every i, j ∈ N . Take F =
∏
i∈N Fi
as the space of such functions. We then introduce the following concept.
Definition 14 (f -variation of G).
Consider a triple (G, f, ζ(f)), where f ∈ F is a profile f = (fi(·))i∈N and ζ : F ⇒ E is a
correspondence, such that, ζ(f) = s is the set of solutions of G under the profile f . We call this
triple an f -variation of G.
Among all possible f -variations of G, we focus on one specific class, which we call divisible f -
variations.
Definition 15 (Divisible f -variations of G).
Fix the game G; let G be a collection of its f -variations (G, ·, ·). We say that G is a collection with
divisible f -variations if for any α, α′ ∈ E, each i ∈ N , and every α′′ ∈ E\{α, α′}, we do not have
ρi(α) = ρi(α
′) ≤ ρi(α′′), and wi(α) = wi(α′) ≥ wi(α′′).
In this class of games, we obtain the following result concerning the uniqueness of a solution.
Proposition 5.
Let G be a collection with divisible f -variations; in ”almost all” f -variations (G, f, ζ(f)) of G we
have |ζ(f)| = 1, i.e., we have a unique solution.
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We provide the proof of this proposition in the Appendix A.2.. We show that the set of f -variations
(G, f, ζ(f)) of G in which |ζ(f)| ≥ 2 has a null Lesbegue measure. Therefore, games with multiple
solutions are exceptional in this class.
5 Conclusion
The equilibrium selection method we propose in this work shares some of the intuition underlying
the method by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), but addresses some important issues on that same work,
that were not solved in Harsanyi (1995). The main one, in particular, concerns the importance
of risk and payoff dominance in the decision to play a given equilibrium action, and the trade-off
between those criteria on such decision.
The selection method depends on a collection of five assumptions, although only two of them
can be empirically falsified. Those assumptions (Assumption 1 and Assumption 5) are, however,
the more relevant ones for the selection process. We propose criteria of risk and payoff dominance as
alternatives to the criteria in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), although the difference in the latter one is
mainly in terms of representation. In comparison to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), our risk-dominance
criterion allows for pairwise transitive comparisons between the equilibria that are eligible for
selection, and incorporates a reasonable level of complexity, even in games with a substantial
number of actions, which should permit its empirical validation.
One of the main questions that we address, and which has been left open in the theoretical
literature on equilibrium selection, concerns how to combine and trade-off the criteria of risk and
payoff dominance. For that purpose, we take into account the available empirical literature, and
propose a measure that combines these dominance criteria, and rationalizes some of the experimen-
tal results. The subsequent measure, that we call the premium of an equilibrium, represents the
risk for a player from choosing to play some equilibrium action, given his perception of the risk,
and the payoff in equilibrium. Using this measure, we define the equilibrium selection as a problem
of minimization of the premium for all the players from playing some action in a particular equi-
librium, whose set of minimizers are the solutions of the game. We show that a preference relation
which has the premium as the underlying measure satisfies a collection of sensible axioms. We also
show that the possible multiplicity of solutions, which is an issue in the majority of the methods
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available in the literature, is not a critical matter in our method. Under certain conditions, which
are quite common and sensible in static games, we prove that almost all games have a unique
solution.
We can identify at least two paths as future directions of research. The first one, which is
perhaps the more evident, concerns the extension of this selection method to other types of game,
such as, dynamic games with asymmetries of information. A second one regards the identification
of the epistemic conditions of this selection method, and its comparison with the conditions in other
selection methods, and equilibrium refinements.
Appendix
Appendix A.1.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Concerning completeness, take α, α′ ∈ E . We either have ρi(α) ≥ ρi(α′) or ρi(α) ≤ ρi(α′), since
ρi(α) and ρi(α
′) are real numbers. Therefore, α %ρi α′ or α′ %
ρ
i α, which implies that %
ρ
i is
complete. Regarding transitivity, take α, α′, α′′ ∈ E . If α %ρi α′ and α′ %ρi α′′, then ρi(α) ≥ ρi(α′)
and ρi(α
′) ≥ ρi(α′′). Since ≥ is transitive on R, we have α %ρi α′′, and %ρi is transitive. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
We check for the effect on %ρi of the conditions satisfied by an isomorphism T . Considering the first
two conditions, there are bijections t and t = (ti)i∈N which rename the players in N and for each
i ∈ N the actions in Ai. These bijections have no strategic impact on G; hence, they preserve the
game’s best-reply correspondence, and the deviations from the equilibria by any i ∈ N . Regarding
the third condition, since α %ρi α′ for α, α′ ∈ E in G, by definition, ρi(α) ≤ ρi(α′). Hence, we can
write the risk of the equilibrium t(α) for player t(i) in G˜ as,
ρt(i)
(
t(α)
)
=
m¯∑
k=1
ηkt(i)
(
t(α)
)
ρkt(i)
(
t(α)
)
. (17)
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Expanding it, we get
m¯∑
k=1
ηkt(i)
(
t(α)
)
ρkt(i)
(
t(α)
)
=
m¯∑
k=1
ηkt(i)
(
t(α)
)[
1−
∏
t(j)
ut(j)
(
tj(αj), t−j(α−j)
)
− ut(j)
(
tj(α
q
j), t−j(α−j)
)
ut(j)
(
tj(αj), t−j(α−j)
)
− ut(j)(xo)
]
,
which means that,
ρt(i)
(
τ(α)
)
=
m¯∑
k=1
ηki (α)
[
1−
∏
j
(θjuj(αj , α−j) + βj)− (θjuj(αqj , α−j) + βj)
(θjuj(αj , α−j) + βj)− (θjuj(xo) + βj)
]
= ρi(α), (18)
where αqj ∈ Aj is the qth best-deviation of j 6= i in G. The risk of the equilibrium t(α
′
) for
t(i) ∈ t(N) follows likewise from the risk of α′ in G. Hence, we conclude that %ρi is invariant to a
game isomorphism. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
We start with Axiom 1. Since for every i ∈ N , %ρi and %ui are invariant to an isomorphism T of
G, given that pi(·) is the aggregation of pii(·), each resulting from the combination of the measures
underlying those preference relations, then we conclude that %pi is also invariant to T . Regarding
Axiom 2, if we strength a ∈ E , then for at least some i ∈ N , w′i(a) > wi(a), and for every j 6= i,
ρj(a) > ρ
′
j(a), where w
′
i(·) and ρj(·) are the payoff weight and risk functions in G′. Then if a %pi α
in G, for α ∈ E , it just follows that a pi α in G′. In the extension of this axiom, when we weaken
a ∈ A, and such profile respects the conditions of Axiom 2′, then ρj(α′) > ρ′j(α′); assuming that the
payoff weights are intact, we have that if α′ %pi α′′ in G, then α′ pi α′′ in G′. Regarding Axiom 3,
if for every i ∈ N , wi(α) ≥ wi(α′′) and wi(α′) ≥ wi(α′′), while ρi(α) ≥ ρi(α′′) and ρi(α′) ≥ ρi(α′′),
it is trivial that pi(α) ≤ pi(α′′) and pi(α′) ≤ pi(α′′), guaranteeing that an equilibrium which is risk
and payoff dominated is not part of the solution set of G.
Appendix A.2.
We construct the proof of Proposition 5 through some lemmata. We start by identifying the vector
space. Fix the game G; we identify G with Rn|E| by considering a f -variation (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G ,
where f = (fi(·))i∈N . Denote as pi,f := (pii,f (α))α∈E the vector of premia of every α ∈ E under
fi(·) for each i ∈ N . We can view pi,f as an element of RE , and pf = (p1,f , . . . , pn,f ) as a vector
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in Rn|E|. Additionally, consider two subsets G 1 and G 2 of G ; the former includes every f -variation
(G, f, ζ(f)) in which |ζ(f)| = 1, and the latter, every f -variation (G, f ′, ζ(f ′)) with f ′ 6= f , in which
|ζ(f ′)| ≥ 2.
Lemma 1.
If G is not a collection with divisible f -variations (G, f, ζ(f)), for every f ∈ F , we have ζ(f) ≥ 2.
Proof. Take an f -variation (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G in which |ζ(f)| ≥ 2. Assume that there is an i ∈ N for
which ρi(α) 6= ρi(α˜), where α, α˜ ∈ ζ(f). Denote as fi(·) = projif the function describing i’s risk
perception. Consider an alternative function f ′i(·) 6= fi(·), such that Df ′i(·) 6= Dfi(·). Under the
profile f , pif (α) = pif (α˜). If instead, we take f
′ = (f ′i(·), f ′−i(·)), in which f ′−i = (fj(·))j 6=i for every
fj(·) = projjf and each j 6= i, then
|pii,f (α)− pii,f ′(α)| 6= |pii,f (α˜)− pii,f ′(α˜)|. (19)
Hence, pif ′(α) 6= pif ′(α˜); it means that there is an (G, f ′, ζ(f ′)) ∈ G in which |ζ(f ′)| = 1, such that,
either α ∈ ζ(f ′) or α˜ ∈ ζ(f ′), providing the necessary contradiction.
Lemma 2.
If G is a collection with divisible f -variations, then G 1 is infinite and uncountable.
Proof. Consider an f -variation (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G where ζ(f) = {α}, and let f = (fi(·), f−i(·)). Take
some i ∈ N for which ρi(α) 6= ρi(α′) in every α′ ∈ E\{α}. If we substitute fi(·) by a positive linear
transformation f ′i(·) = cfi(·), where c ∈ R+, in a certain interval of c, we have
pii,f ′(α)− pii,f ′(α′) ≥ pii,f (α)− pii,f (α′). (20)
Considering that τi(·) is a concave function, there is an interval [a, b], for a, b ∈ R and b > a, where
for every c ∈ [a, b], the positive linear transformation f ′i(·) = cfi(·) satisfies Equation (20). Since
τi(·) has a semi-open domain, it trivially follows that the interval between a and b is not necessarily
closed. Since some open interval [a, b) ⊂ R is uncountable, then also is the set of positive linear
transformations f ′i(·) = cfi(·) respecting condition Equation (20), which completes the proof.
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Lemma 3.
If G is a collection with divisible f -variations, then G 2 is countable.
Proof. We first show that G 2 can be empty. Fix G; for each i ∈ N , let ρi(α) < ρi(α′) and
wi(α) > wi(α
′) for some α ∈ E and every α′ ∈ E\{α}. Independently of f ∈ F , pi(α) < pi(α′); thus
in every f -variation (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G , ζ(f) = {α}. If G 2 6= ∅, take an f -variation (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G
where, for simplicity, ζ(f) = {α, α′}, although a higher cardinality does not change the proof.
Consider a profile f ′ ∈ F in some (G, f ′, ζ(f ′)) ∈ G , where f−i(·) = f ′−i(·) with f−i(·) = (fj(·))j 6=i
and fj(·) = projjf , and fi(·) 6= f ′i(·), in which fi(·) = projif and f ′i(·) = projif ′.
Define a function c : G 2 → N for which c(G, f, ζ(f)) = c(G, f ′, ζ(f ′)) = m, for some m ∈ N,
if f ′ = (f ′i(·), f−i(·)) and ζ(f ′) = ζ(f). We can define an equivalence class [G 2m] ⊆ G 2, in which
[G 2m] = {(G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G 2|c(G, f, ζ(f)) = m}. We can show that #[G 2m] ≤ n. Assume that τi(·) is
a linear function, such that, to each i ∈ N , the weight of the premium pii(·) is the same in pi(·). If
(G, f, ζ(f)) is an f -variation where ζ(f) = {α, α′}, then for f ′ ∈ F ,
pii,f (α)− pii,f ′(α) 6= pii,f (α′)− pii,f ′(α′). (21)
Then, pif ′(α) 6= pif ′(α′). If now τi(·) is a concave function with a single maximum, then there is, at
the most, a unique pair fi, f
′
i ∈ Fi, for which
τi(pii,f (α))− τi(pii,f ′(α)) = τi(pii,f (α′))− τi(pii,f ′(α′)). (22)
Since that holds for every i ∈ N , #[G 2m] is bounded by n. It is then trivial to check that each
f -variation (G, f, ζ(f)) in which |ζ(f)| ≥ 2 belongs to an equivalence class as [G 2m].
Proof of Proposition 5.
Considering Lemma 1, if G is a collection with divisible f -variations, there is some (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G
in which |ζ(f)| = 1; thus, G 1 6= ∅. Denote as µ(·) the Lebesgue measure on Rn|E|. We have not
identified the dimension of G 2. However, by Lemma 3, we know that every f -variation (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈
G 2 belongs to some equivalence class [G 2m] ⊂ G 2, where m ∈ N, which has a finite number of
elements. Because G 2 is countable following Lemma 3, then µ(G 2) = 0; hence, ”almost all” f -
variations (G, f, ζ(f)) ∈ G have |ζ(f)| = 1. 
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Chapter 2
Equilibrium selection in dynamic games with asymmetric
information
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Abstract
In this work, we extend the author’s equilibrium selection method, initially applied to static
games with complete information, to dynamic games with asymmetric information. We adjust
the method to games in extensive-form by reformulating its assumptions, and some features of
the selection mechanism. We define the solution of a dynamic game as a sequential equilibrium
that conditionally minimizes the risk to the players, given their perception of the risk and its
payoff. We show that a solution is invariant to different forms of isomorphism of the extensive-
form; however, due to the sequential nature of decision-making, we show that a solution of the
extensive-form does not necessarily coincide with the solution from its reduced normal-form.
We conclude the paper with an application of this method to the most simple version of Spence
signaling game with just two types of worker.
Keywords: equilibrium selection, sequential equilibrium, dynamic game, asymmetric informa-
tion, Spence signaling game.
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1 Introduction
In Silva (2019) we propose an equilibrium selection method to static games with complete infor-
mation. In that work, we define the solution of a static game as an admissible Nash equilibrium
that minimizes the risk to a player, given his perception about the risk and its payoff, conditional
on the same being true for every opponent. We show that in a particular class of games, ”almost
all” have a unique solution; the set of games with multiple solutions has a null Lebesgue measure,
thus being negligible. In this work, we extend the method in its more immediate and reasonable
direction, which is to dynamic games with asymmetric information. In the first part of the work,
we discuss and characterize the main features of such extension. In the second part, we further
adjust the method to signaling games with a finite number of player types and apply it to the most
simple version of Spence signaling game (Spence, 1973) with just two types.
As in static games with complete information, there is a large literature in equilibrium selection
in dynamic games; however, in the former type of games, it is more challenging to organize the
literature into distinct research programs. The only general methods of selection on this type of
games are from Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Harsanyi (1995a) that we have already discussed in
Silva (2019), and Harsanyi (1995b), which is a direct generalization of Harsanyi’s method to games
with incomplete information. We roughly divide into two groups. One group includes equilibrium
refinement concepts. In comparison to static games, one concept, the sequential equilibrium, in
one of its many forms (depending on the requirements on belief formation and consistency), is seen
as the most sensible option. The other group includes methods and criteria with some degree of
symbiosis with a sequential equilibrium, i.e., they take that refinement as the starting point of the
selection process. As in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the methods and criteria in the latter group
represent the culmination point of the equilibrium refinement program. We shall briefly address
the main theories in each group.
Concerning the equilibrium refinements to dynamic games, since many of them are just vari-
ations of older ones, we just highlight three concepts. We start with the concept of subgame
perfection (Selten, 1975). The intuition underlying it is that a player’s optimal strategy should
prescribe a best-reply in every subgame that the play of the game reaches with positive probability.
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In perfect information games, and with some exceptions in non-generic games 1, or games without
non-trivial subgames2, it reduces the set of Nash equilibria down to a singleton. With imperfect
information, that result is no longer always possible, as subgame perfection may select multiple
Nash equilibria, among which, some may not be sensible. However, these issues are common to the
following refinements.
The first one is the extensive-form version of the perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975). As in its
strategic-form version, it selects equilibrium actions that are optimal, at each information set, even
when a player has a small probability of deviating to another action. Perfect equilibria are limit
points of sequences of equilibrium outcomes from a collection of games in which players have small
but positive, probabilities of deviating from their equilibrium strategies. However, this refinement
demands excessively from the players’ rationality. To understand that claim, we have first to
introduce the concept of sequential equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson, 1982b). This refinement shares
the intuition of a subgame perfect equilibrium since it prescribes a player to choose strategies that
are optimal in every information set that the play of the game can reach with positive probability,
i.e., strategies that are sequentially rational. However, sequential rationality should consider the
player’s consistent beliefs about the play of the game reaching each of the nodes in his information
sets, and how on the game will proceed afterward; we provide a definition of consistency in Section
2. In comparison to perfectness, a sequential equilibrium requires players’ to be sequentially rational
at the limit of a sequence of perturbed games, while in the former concept that is required in every
perturbed game; however, in generic extensive-form games this difference almost disappears, as the
sets of perfect and sequential equilibria nearly coincide.
Regarding the theories of equilibrium selection in dynamic games, they further refine the sequen-
tial equilibrium predictions. We start with two popular selection criteria, which aim at excluding
unreasonable sequential equilibria of a game, and at providing behavioral foundations to Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986) notion of strategic stability. These criteria are valid in signaling games, which
although less complex than general extensive-form games play an important role in economics; for
instance, in the analysis of labor markets, entry and deterrence problems, or IPO’s. The first one
is the intuitive criterion (Cho & Kreps, 1987). It follows the principle that in a sensible sequential
1A game in which a player has two or more best replies to some particular vector of opponents’ strategies that
are payoff equivalent.
2An extensive-form game without another subgame than the game itself.
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equilibrium we do not expect some types of sender to choose specific strategies. Hence, a sequential
equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion if no type of sender can profitably deviate to an off-the-
equilibrium strategy. This criterion selects a single sequential equilibrium in signaling games with
two types of sender, such as a two types version of the Spence (1973) signaling model. However,
it cannot guarantee the same result as the number of types increase. In that case, if more than
one type of sender has a profitable deviation, the beliefs of the receiver associate the same devi-
ation likelihood to each of the sender’s types. The second one is the divinity criterion (Banks &
Sobel, 1987). It minimizes some of the issues in the intuitive criterion, as it provides more sensible
predictions in signaling games with a larger number of types, and assumes that the beliefs of a
receiver can associate distinct likelihoods of deviation to different types. However, it is incapable
of selecting a single sequential equilibrium in many signaling games.
An alternative to those criteria explores the effects of reputation on the selection of an equi-
librium. In signaling games with a single long-run player (an incumbent) and multiple short-run
players (entrants), both Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) challenge the
sequential equilibrium prediction in which every entrant enters, and the incumbent accommodates
the entry. They conclude it is sufficient to assume the existence of a certain probability of the in-
cumbent fighting every time the entrant enters. Extensions can be found in Fudenberg and Levine
(1989), which covers a broader class of games, and introduces a single patient long-run player3, and
Aumann and Sorin (1989), which considers multiple long-run players. However, works considering
the effects of reputation provide firm conclusions only on a restrict number of games4 and do not
necessarily guarantee the selection of a single solution.
Another approach, common in the analysis of multilateral vertical contracting problems, con-
siders the effect of different types’ of beliefs.5 The selection of an equilibrium depends on the beliefs
that a downstream firm has about the off-the-equilibrium path behavior in a game. Those beliefs
are of one of three types. The first type, which is simultaneously the most common assumption in
this literature, are called ”passive” beliefs (Rey & Tirole, 2007). In this case, a downstream firm
3The patient long-run player discounts his payoffs with a factor near one, and the short-term players with a factor
near zero. In the chain-store game, it implies that the incumbent has a stronger incentive to fight.
4For example, in dynamic games with only long-run players, reputation effects do not provide reasonable predic-
tions.
5These are contracting problems with an upstream firm, usually a monopolist, who sells a product to possible
several downstream firms. Some examples are the relationship between a manufacturer and several distributors, and
between a franchisor and his franchisees.
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who receives an off-the-equilibrium offer does not update its beliefs about the offers made to the
other firms. The second type are called ”symmetric” beliefs (Pagnozzi & Piccolo, 2012). Therefore,
conditional on observing a deviation, a downstream firm believes that all the other downstream
firms have also received off-the-equilibrium offers. The last type are known as ”wary” beliefs (Rey
& Verge´, 2004), in which case, a downstream firm believes that an upstream firm only deviates if
it is to an optimal strategy.
The number of selection methods in dynamic games, although not residual, is smaller than in
static games. A couple of reasons may justify this scenario. The first one is the lower level of
complexity of games in strategic-form. The second one concerns Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)
arguments, under which methods to strategic-form games can be applied to extensive-form games
if represented in their reduced normal-form. However, we follow the branch of the literature that
considers that the information of a dynamic game cannot be entirely encompassed in its strategic-
form representation. Therefore, we see the necessity for a selection method that is directly applied
and adjusted to extensive-form games.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the assumptions underlying the
process of equilibrium selection. In Section 3, we define risk and payoff dominance criteria, and
characterize the selection mechanism. These sections are mainly a straight adaptation of Silva
(2019). We proceed to show that a solution is invariant to symmetries between elements of the
game; however, a solution in the extensive-form representation of a game does not necessarily
coincide with the solution of its reduced normal-form. In Section 4, we apply the selection method
to the most simple version of Spence (1973) signaling game with only two types of worker; we show
that a solution depends on the prior probability of a worker being of a highly productive type, and
compare it with the results in Cho and Kreps (1987) and in the application of Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) made by van Damme and Gu¨th (1991). In Section 5, we summarize the main conclusions
and provide some directions for future research.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The game
Consider a finite dynamic game G with imperfect information in extensive-form and a set of players
N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n}.6
2.1.1 Game tree
Let A be a finite set of actions, and X a set of nodes. Each x ∈ X is a finite sequence of actions
ak ∈ A, such that, x = (a1, . . . ak), and a1, . . . , ak ∈ A. We define a partial order  over X, such
that, x follows x′, which we write x  x′, if x = (x′, a1, . . . , ak) and k ≥ 1. When k = 1, we say
that x immediately follows x′, and write x  x′.
Let W ⊂ X be the set of initial nodes. The game starts at one node x0 ∈ W controlled
by Nature, who moves first and just once according to a family of probability distributions p =
(px0)x0∈W , such that, px0 is the realization probability of the nodes immediately following x0 ∈W .
We assume that px0(x) > 0 for every x  x0, and that p is common knowledge among the players.
The game ends at one or more terminal nodes in a set Z := {x ∈ X | (x, a) /∈ X,∀a ∈ A}.
We call x ∈ X\(W ∪ Z) a decision node; the nodes that immediately follow it belong to the
set C(x) = {x′ ∈ X\(W ∪ Z) |x′  x}, while the the feasible actions at x belong to A(x) := {a ∈
A | (x, a) ∈ X}. The player who moves at x ∈ X\(W ∪ Z), which we call the active player at x, is
identified by ι : X\(W ∪ Z)→ N . The set Xi := {x ∈ X\(W ∪ Z) | ι(x) = i} includes the decision
nodes in which player i ∈ N is active, and the set Ai := {a ∈ A | (x, a) ∈ X, ι(x) = i} the available
actions at each x ∈ Xi.
We divide the nodes in Xi of player i into information sets. We say that two decision nodes
x, x′ ∈ X\(W ∪ Z) belong to the same information set of player i if ι(x) = ι(x′) and A(x) =
A(x′). We denote as hi(x) the information set containing x ∈ X, while the collection Hi ={
hi(x) | ι(x) = i, for x ∈ X\(W ∪ Z)} includes all information sets of player i, and H :=
⋃
i∈N Hi
all the information sets in G. We also assume that G has perfect recall, so we can establish an
unambiguously partial order over the information sets in H according to the partial order .
6We consider that a game G is dynamic if the problem involves sequential decision-making. In that case, there is
a unique extensive-form representation of the problem, which we preserve throughout the selection analysis.
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Definition 1 (Perfect recall).
We write xRpx′ for any x, x′ ∈ X\(W ∪ Z) if h(x) = h(x′) implies that:
• there are xˆ, x˜ ∈ X\(W ∪ Z), such that, ι(x) = ι(xˆ), with x˜ ∈ C(xˆ) and x  x˜;
• there are xˆ′, x˜′ ∈ X\(W ∪Z), for which h(xˆ′) = h(xˆ), with x˜′ ∈ C(xˆ′), and where x′  x˜′ and
A(x˜) = A(x˜′).
We write xRp = {x′ ∈ X\(W ∪ Z) |xRpx′}; G has perfect recall if xRp = h(x) for each x ∈
X\(W ∪ Z).
The payoff function ui : Z → R is a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function. Therefore, we
identify G with an extensive-form
〈
X,, N,W,X,H,A, u, p〉.
2.1.2 Strategies
A pure strategy of player i is a function si : Hi → A where si
(
hi(x)
) ∈ A(x) for any x ∈ X\(W ∪Z),
with ι(x) = i. We denote as Si the set of pure strategies of player i. A mixed strategy σi is a
probability distribution over Si; instead, a behavior strategy βi is a probability distribution over
the actions available to player i at each hi ∈ Hi7. Denote as A(hi) the set of actions available at
hi ∈ Hi, such that, βi : A(hi)→ [0, 1] for every hi ∈ Hi, in which
∑
ai∈A(hi) βi(hi; ai) = 1. We call
a behavioral strategy βi completely mixed if βi(hi; ai) > 0 for every ai ∈ Ai(hi) and hi ∈ Hi; we
call it pure if βi(hi; ai) = 1 for some ai ∈ Ai(hi) and every hi ∈ Hi, denoting it as βpi ∈ Bi. Each
i ∈ N has a set Bi of behavioral strategies, and a set Bpi of pure behavioral strategies. We denote
β as a generic vector of behavioral strategies, such that, β ∈ B := ∏i∈N Bi, and β−i a vector in
B−i :=
∏
j 6=iBj .
2.1.3 Equilibrium
A system of beliefs is a function µ : X\(W ∪ Z) → [0, 1] where ∑x∈h(x) µ(x) = 1 for each h ∈ H.
Therefore, a belief µ(x) is the probability that player ι(x) assigns to x if h(x) is reached with
positive probability.
We call a pair (β, µ) an assessment. The expected payoff of (β, µ) to player i if the game reaches
hi ∈ Hi with positive probability, and if all the players follow β, given that the play of the game is
7We denote an information set of player i ∈ N as hi whenever it does not lead to any ambiguity.
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at x, is
vi(β|hi, µ) =
∑
x∈hi
µ(x)ui(β|x). (1)
An assessment (β, µ) may have a couple of desirable properties.
Definition 2 (Consistency).
An assessment (β, µ) is consistent if there is a sequence of completely mixed behavioral strategies
βn converging to β, such that, a sequence of systems of beliefs µn, each one derived from the Bayes
rule, converges to µ.
Definition 3 (Sequential rationality).
An assessment (β, µ) is sequentially rational if for every i ∈ N , hi ∈ Hi, and β′i ∈ Bi, we have for
β−i ∈ B−i,
vi(β|hi, µ) ≥ vi(β′i, β−i|hi, µ).
Thus, we define a sequential equilibrium following the definition in Kreps and Wilson (1982b).
Definition 4 (Sequential equilibrium).
An assessment (β, µ) is a sequential equilibrium if it is consistent and sequentially rational.
Denote as E(G) the set of Nash equilibria, and as S(G) set of sequential equilibria; the latter one
may include an infinite number of assessments. In Section 3, we discuss under which conditions we
allow the set S(G) to be infinite, and which procedure do we follow in that case.
2.2 The assumptions
As in static games, the process of equilibrium selection depends on a collection of assumptions.
These assumptions aim at eliminating strategically irrelevant elements from the game, guaranteeing
that the method is well-behaved, and characterizing a player’s behavior further. We start with two
assumptions that are almost identical to assumptions 1 and 4 in Silva (2019).
Assumption 1.
Each i ∈ N is rational; therefore, no player chooses with positive probability a strictly dominated
strategy, which is common knowledge among the players. Hence, we simplify G through an iterated
process of elimination of strictly dominated behavioral strategies whenever possible.
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Assumption 2.
The utility function ui : X → R, with Z ⊆ X, of every i ∈ N intersects in a point xo ∈ X, such
that ui(x
o) = 0. Moreover, for every i ∈ N , ui(z) ≥ 0 in each z ∈ Z. Hence, the players have
interval-scale measurable payoffs with a common origin.
The next assumption adapts assumption 2 in Silva (2019), controlling for the existence of duplicate
behavioral strategies.
Assumption 3.
In G, we substitute strategically equivalent behavioral strategies by a single representative strategy.
Two behavioral strategies βi, βˆi ∈ Bi are strategically equivalent, which we write βi ≈i βˆi, if:
• uj(βi, β−i) = uj(βˆi, β−i) for every β−i ∈ B−i and j ∈ N ;
• for any ai ∈ supp(βi) and aˆi ∈ supp(βˆi), hj(xi, ai) = hj(xi, aˆi) for any j ∈ N and hj ∈ Hj ,
where xi ∈ hi and (xi, ai), (xi, aˆi) ∈ X\Z.
We substitute these strategies by a representative element bi ∈ Bi of an equivalence class [bi] =
{βi ∈ Bi |βi ∼bi bi}. If we assume that bi = βi for some βi ∈ [bi], then every aˆi ∈ supp(βˆi) in
any βˆi ∈ [bi]\{βi} is played with null probability in every behavioral strategy both in G and every
neighboring game8 unless aˆi ∈ supp(βˆi) ∩ supp(βi) and βi /∈ [bi]. Additionally, if βpi ∈ Bpi and
βi ∈ Bi belong to [bi], and supp(βpi ) ⊂ supp(βi), then βi cannot be the representative of [bi].
This assumption has an important effect on the set of sequential equilibria. To understand it,
consider the game G1 in Figure 1.
1
(4, 4)
O
(5, 3)
C
(3, 1)
D
A
(5, 3)
C
(3, 1)
D
A′
(1, 1)
C
(1, 3)
D
B
2
Figure 1: Game G1.
8A game where a player’s payoffs are in the neighborhood of those in G, which is a point in Rn with the `∞ norm.
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In G1 there is one sequential equilibria where:
◦ player 1 plays β1(∅;O,A,A′, B) = (1, 0, 0, 0);
◦ player 2 best-replies with β2({A,A′, B};C,D) = (1− p, p) for p ≥ 1/6, which is sequentially
rational given a system of beliefs µ({A,A′, B};A,A′, B) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
However, β1(∅;A) and β1(∅;A′) are strategically equivalent. If we assume that β1(∅;A′) = 0, then
player 1 chooses A′ with null probability. Hence, the previous sequential equilibrium no longer
holds, and in this case:
◦ if player 1 plays β1(∅;O,A,A′, B) = (1, 0, 0, 0);
◦ it is sequentially rational for player 2 to choose β2({A,B};C,D) = (1 − q, q) for q ≥ 1/2,
given that µ({A,B};A,B) = (1/2, 1/2).
The next assumption adapts another assumption from Silva (2019), this time concerning the exis-
tence of duplicate players.
Assumption 4.
In G, we apply the coalescing of duplicate players whenever possible.
Players i and j are duplicates of one another if:
• for k, ` = i, and k 6= `, with βk ∈ Bk and β`, β′` ∈ B`, and β−k−` ∈
∏
h∈N\{i,j}Bh,
uk(βk, β`, β−k−`) = uk(βk, β′`, β−k−`);
• a permutation of the players i and j in G generates an isomorphic game9.
In this case, players i and j belong to an equivalence class Nd, which is represented by i¯. However,
the coalescing of these players only takes place if we satisfy an additional condition:
(a) Let Xi¯ = Xi∪Xj , Hi¯ = Hi∪Hj , and Ai¯ = Ai∪Aj if and only if for x ∈ hi(xˆ) and x′ ∈ hj(x˜),
we have xRp = hi(xˆ) and x
′Rp = hj(x˜).
If this condition is not satisfied, players i and j are no longer duplicates of one another; therefore,
we preserve the perfect recall in G. That is not the case, for example, in a similar transformation
by Hoshi and Isaac (2010).
9We provide two definitions of isomorphism of the extensive-form in Definitions 19 and 20.
46
Before making a final assumption, we introduce some additional elements. We start by classi-
fying the nodes in G according with their position in the tree.
Definition 5 (Levels).
In G, we divide the nodes of X in levels, such that:
• Level 1 nodes: every x ∈ X for which x  x0 and x0 ∈ W . Let X1 ⊂ X be the set of those
nodes, and Xi,1 ⊆ X1 the set of player i’s nodes;
• Level 2 nodes: every x ∈ X\X1 for which x′  x and x ∈ X1. Let X2 ⊂ X be the set of those
nodes, and Xi,2 ⊆ X2 the set of player i’s nodes;
• Level k nodes: every x ∈ X\⋃k−1`=1 X` for which x′′  x and x ∈ Xk−1. Let Xk ⊂ X be the
set of those nodes, and Xi,k ⊆ Xk the set of player i’s nodes;
Let Bi be player i’s set of admissible behavioral strategies. Take E as the set of admissible Nash
equilibria β belonging to a sequential equilibrium assessment (β, µ), i.e., for each β ∈ E , (β, µ) ∈
S(G). The set Bi = Bi ∩ projiE includes admissible behavioral strategies βi := projiβ that belong
to some admissible equilibrium β ∈ E , such that, (β, µ) is a sequential equilibrium. Finally, let S
be the set of sequential equilibria (β, µ) in which β ∈ E . We then introduce the concept of auxiliary
game.
Definition 6 (Auxiliary game Γ(1)).
The tuple Γ =
〈
G,B(1),S 〉 is an auxiliary game of G, in which B(1) = B, and B = ∏i∈N Bi, such
that each i ∈ N only chooses behavioral strategies in Bi.
The auxiliary game Γ(1) is an auxiliary structure of G that restricts the strategies that each i ∈ N
can conceivably choose, and consequently the sequential equilibria eligible for selection.
We define additional auxiliary games of G, where players’ decisions depend on certain collections
of nodes. Therefore, write a behavioral strategy βi = (βi,1, βi,2, . . . , βi,k, . . . , βi,K), where βi,k is the
probability distribution over the actions Ai,k(hi,k) available at hi,k ∈ Hi,k, such that, Hi,k ⊃ Xi,k,
and Xi,k is the set of nodes of player i at level k of the game tree of G. If the set Xi,k = ∅, then
βi,k is empty.
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Definition 7 (Auxiliary game Γ(k)).
The tuple Γ(k) =
〈
G,B(k),S 〉 with k > 1 is an auxiliary game Γ(k) of G, where Bi(k) ⊂ Bi. Write
a behavioral strategy βi(k) ∈ Bi(k) as βi(k) = (βi,1, . . . , βi,k−1, βi,k, . . . , βi,K), where (βi,1, . . . , βi,k−1)
are fixed, and (βi,k, . . . , βi,K) are player i’s probability distributions over actions available at the
nodes in
⋃K
`=kXi,`. For simplicity, we write Xi(k) =
⋃K
`=kXi,`, denote as Ai(k) the set of available
actions at those nodes, and as Hi(k) the collection of information sets.
In Definition 7, a fixed (βi,1, . . . , βi,k−1) means that player i has already chosen those distributions
as part of the behavioral strategy βi(k). Let Γ = {Γ(k)}Kk=1 be the collection of all auxiliary games
of G, which we call its full auxiliary structure. We then make one final assumption.
Assumption 5.
Fix N and B(1), . . . ,B(K); let G be a collection of all auxiliary structures Γ of G with a set of
players N and spaces of behavioral strategies B(1), . . . ,B(K). Then each i ∈ N uses a selection
mechanism si : G ⇒ S , such that, si(Γ) includes the sequential equilibria selected by player i in
G.10
The intuition for Assumption 5 is that each i ∈ N do not only conduct a process of selection ex-
ante, which corresponds to the application of the selection mechanism to the auxiliary game Γ(1);
he also conducts such selection process in several interim stages, each one corresponding to each of
several auxiliary games in Γ\Γ(1).
3 Criteria and selection
In this section, we characterize the process of equilibrium selection. We start by defining the criteria
of risk and payoff dominance given the sequential nature of decision making, and the method’s
assumptions. Afterwards we describe the process of selection of a solution. We omit, whenever
that information is available in Silva (2019), the intuition and details of some elements and the
proofs of some results.
10As in static games, when we say that i ∈ N chooses or selects a sequential equilibrium (β, µ) ∈ S , we mean
that player i chooses an equilibrium behavioral strategy βi := projiβ considering that every j 6= i choose equilibrium
behavioral strategies βj := projjβ.
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3.1 Dominance criteria
Write a sequential equilibrium (β, µ) ∈ S as (βi, β−i;µ), where β−i := (βj)j 6=i, and each βj :=
projjβ, and βi := projiβ. Assume, for now, that S is finite. In each Γ(k) ∈ Γ, write as ui(β|µ, x)
the expected payoff of (β, µ) for player i, given that all the players’ follow β and the play of the
game is at x ∈ Xk. Denote as Hi(k) = {hi ∈ Hi(k)|µβ(x) > 0, x ∈ hi} the information sets that the
play of the game reaches with positive probability when the players’ beliefs are given by µ and the
strategies are in β. In the auxiliary game Γ(1), we just write ui(β|µ) since the play of the game is
at x0 ∈W ; that auxiliary game corresponds to the ex-ante version of G. Considering the auxiliary
games in Γ, we introduce the concept of best-deviation in each of them.
Definition 8 (Best-deviation).
In an auxiliary game Γ(k), given that the play of the game is at x ∈ Xk, the best-deviation by player
i from an equilibrium strategy βi in (βi, β−i;µ) ∈ S is a strategy β1i (k) ∈ Bi(k)\{βi}, such that,
for every β′i(k) ∈ Bi(k)\{βi, β1i (k)},
vi(βi, β−i|µ, hi) ≥ vi(β1i (k), β−i|µ, hi) ≥ vi(β′i(k), β−i|µ, hi), ∀hi ∈ Hi(k).
This best-deviation induces a relative utility loss λβ,µ(β
1
i (k)), where
λβ,µ(β
1
i (k)) =
ui(βi, β−i|µ, x)− ui(β1i (k), β−i|µ, x)
ui(βi, β−i|µ, x)− ui(xo) .
We now generalize the concept of best-deviation considering that Bi(k) in each Γ(k) ∈ Γ does not
have necessarily just two behavioral strategies.
Definition 9 (Best-deviation generalization).
In an auxiliary game Γ(k), given that the play of the game is at x ∈ Xk, let |Bi(k)\{βi}| = mki ;
the `th best-deviation by player i from an equilibrium strategy βi in (βi, β−i), µ) ∈ S is a strategy
β`i (k) ∈ Bi(k)\{βi} ∪ {βhi (k)}`−1h=1, such that, for every strategy β′i(k) ∈ Bi(k)\{βi} ∪ {βhi (k)}`h=1,
vi(β
`
i (k), β−i|µ, hi) ≥ vi(β′i(k), β−i|µ, hi), ∀hi ∈ Hi.
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This best-deviation induces a relative utility loss λβ,µ(β
`
i (k)), where
λβ,µ(β
`
i (k)) =
ui(βi, β−i|µ, x)− ui(β`i (k), β−i|µ, x)
ui(βi, β−i|µ, x)− ui(xo) .
If Bi(k)\{βi} ∪ {βhi (k)}`h=1 = ∅, then ` = mki , and player i has no more possible deviations.
Denote as δki (β, µ) = {β`i (k)}m
k
i
`=1 the set of all possible deviations by player i from (β, µ) ∈ S in
Γ(k) ∈ Γ. The collection of all possible deviations from that sequential equilibrium by every i ∈ N
in Γ(k) is,
δk(β, µ) =
⋃
i∈N
δki (β, µ).
Let the collection without player i’s deviations be,
δk−i(β, µ) =
⋃
j 6=i
δkj (β, µ).
Consider a collection P
(
δk−i(β, µ)
)
of all possible combinations of deviations in δk−i(β, µ) in Γ(k),
which satisfies the following conditions:
a) for every set δ¯k(β, µ) ∈ P(δk−i(β, µ)), let |δ¯k(β, µ)∩ δki (β, µ)| = {0, 1}, and 0 < |δ¯k(β, µ)| ≤ n,
such that δk−i(β, µ) /∈ P
(
δk−i(β, µ)
)
;
b) P
(
δk−i(β, µ)
) ⊂P(δk−i(β, µ)), in which P(δ−i(β, µ)) is the power set of δk−i(β, µ).
We define a function,
ri : P
(
δk−i(β, µ)
)→ [0, 1],
such that, for any δ¯k(β, µ) ∈ P(δk−i(β, µ)) we have,
δ¯k(β, µ) 7→ ri
(
δ¯k((β, µ))
)
=
∏
j 6=i
λβ,µ(β
`
j(k)), ∀β`j(k) ∈ δ¯k(β, µ).
Using the function ri(·), we can identify in each Γ(k) ∈ Γ the degrees of risk of every (β, µ) ∈ S
to player i.
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Definition 10 (Degrees of risk).
The risk of degree 1 of a sequential equilibrium to i ∈ N in Γ(k) is a function ρ1i,k : S → [0, 1],
such that on (β, µ) ∈ S ,
ρ1i,k(β, µ) =

1− ri
(
δ¯k(β, µ)
)
, for ri
(
δ¯k(β, µ)
) ≤ ri(δ¯k ′(β, µ)),∀δ¯k ′(β, µ) ∈ P(δk−i(β, µ)),
0, if P
(
δk−i(β, µ)
)
= ∅.
Let m¯k = maxi∈N |P
(
δk−i(β, µ)
)|; the risk of degree ` of a sequential equilibrium to i ∈ N is a
function ρ`i,k : S → [0, 1], such that, ` ≤ m¯k, and on (β, µ) ∈ S ,
ρ`i,k(β, µ) =

1− ri
(
δ¯k(β, µ)
)
, ri
(
δ¯k(β, µ)
) ≤ ri(δ¯k ′(β, µ)), ∀δ¯k ′(β, µ) ∈ P(δk−i(β, µ))\{δ¯kh(β, µ)}`−1h=1,
0, if P
(
δk−i(β, µ)
)\{δ¯kh(β, µ)}`−1
h=1
= ∅.
We unify the degrees of risk of (β, µ) ∈ S to player i in Γ(k) ∈ Γ into a unique measure.
Definition 11 (Risk).
The risk of a sequential equilibrium to i ∈ N in Γ(k) is a function ρi,k : S → R, such that on
(β, µ) ∈ S ,
ρi,k(β, µ) =
m¯k∑
j=1
ηji,k(β, µ)ρ
j
i,k(β, µ).
Each weight ηji,k(β, µ) ∈ [0, 1] is an element of a finite monotonic weakly decreasing sequence of
weights ηi,k(β, µ) = {η`i,k(β, µ)}m¯
k
`=1, such that, for j 6= h,
ηji,k(β, µ) = 1−
m¯k∑
h∈{1,...,m¯k}\j
ηhi,k(β, µ), and η
h
i,k(β, µ) =
ρhi,k(β, µ)
ρji,k(β, µ)
ηji,k(β, µ),
and,
m¯k∑
j=1
ηji,k(β, µ) = 1.
We assume that the risk of (β, µ) ∈ S is fully characterized by deviations of each player i from their
equilibrium strategies both on and off-the-equilibrium path. We could have chosen a different route,
looking instead to deviations in the beliefs (e.g., a mistake or tremble). However, that approach is
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more complex, given the necessary restrictions on the mistakes that a player can eventually make.
Since there would exist a bijection between the strategies that are sequentially rational to those
incorrect beliefs, and those that are best-deviations, we opted for the latter approach. We can now
define the criterion of risk-dominance on Γ(k).
Definition 12 (Risk-dominance).
In Γ(k), each i ∈ N has a binary relation %ρi,k, a risk-dominance relation, over S , such that for
any (β
′
, µ
′
), (β
′′
, µ
′′
) ∈ S , (β′ , µ′) risk dominates (β′′ , µ′′), which we write (β′ , µ′) ρi,k (β
′′
, µ
′′
), if
ρi,k(β
′
) ≤ ρi,k(β′′).
The risk-dominance relation %ρi,k is a preference relation according to Proposition 1 in Silva (2019).
As for the criterion of payoff dominance, we adapt the definition in Silva (2019) to a different class
of equilibria.
Definition 13 (Weight of an equilibrium payoff).
In Γ(k), given that the play of the game is at x ∈ Xk, the weight of the payoff of a sequential
equilibrium to player i is a function wi,k : S → R, such that, on (β, µ) ∈ S we have,
wi,k(β, µ) =
ui(β|µ, x)− ui(xo)∑
(β′,µ′)∈S
(
ui(β′|µ′, x)− ui(xo)
)
+ 1
.
We define the criterion of payoff-dominance as follows.
Definition 14 (Payoff-dominance).
In Γ(k), each i ∈ N has a binary relation %ui,k over S , such that for any (β, µ), (β′, µ′) ∈ S , (β, µ)
payoff dominates (β′, µ′), which we write (β, µ) %ui,k (β′, µ′), if wi,k(β, µ) ≥ wi,k(β′, µ′).
Remark 1.
Take (β, µ), (β′, µ′) ∈ S , and let (β, µ) be risk and payoff dominant over (β′, µ′) for each i ∈ N in
every Γ(k) ∈ Γ; hence, (β′, µ′) is not eligible for selection, and the set Bi = Bi∩projiE\β′ if β 6= β′
for every i ∈ N . Since (β′, µ′) is not the solution of G, deviations by the players to equilibrium
strategies part of β′ do not matter in the process of equilibrium selection (in Silva (2019), we provide
the intuition for the set Bi, which completes this remark).
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Remark 2.
We do not restrict the dimension of the set S in G. However, we only apply the selection mech-
anism when S has an infinite number of sequential equilibria if only a finite number of them are
not risk and payoff dominated for every player i ∈ N . We do not make this remark in Silva (2019),
but it is trivial to verify that it is also valid in static games.
3.2 Equilibrium selection
The process of equilibrium selection in G is not exactly the same as in Silva (2019). The difference
is that, due to the sequential nature of decision-making, we consider several stages of evaluation
of an equilibrium, i.e., ex-ante and interim stages. Nonetheless, the intuition for the selection of a
solution in static and dynamic games remains similar. We start the characterization of the selection
process of a sequential equilibrium in Γ(k) with the definition of the concept of premium.
Definition 15 (Premium in Γ(k)).
The premium pii,k of a sequential equilibrium in Γ(k) to player i is a function pii,k : S → R, such
that, at (β, µ) ∈ S we have,
pii,k(β, µ) =
1
1 + wi,k(β, µ)
fi
(
1 + ρi,k(β, µ)
)
.
The function fi : [0,∞) → [1,∞), which is the same in every Γ(k) ∈ Γ, describes player i’s
perception of the risk of a sequential equilibrium, being increasing, continuous, and either: (i)
convex, with a slope greater or equal than one in its entire domain; (ii) concave, with a slope less
or equal than one in its entire domain; (iii) linear, with a slope of exactly one in its entire domain.
In each Γ(k) ∈ Γ, every (β, µ) ∈ S has a particular premium pii,k(β, µ) for player i. We can now
properly construct the premium of a sequential equilibrium in G.
Definition 16 (Premium in G).
Consider the collection {pii,k(β, µ)}Kk=1 of the premia of (β, µ) ∈ S to player i in each Γ(k) ∈ Γ.
Its premium in G is,
pii(β, µ) =
K∑
k=1
νi,k(pii,k(β, µ))pii,k(β, µ).
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Each weight νi,k(pii,k(β, µ)) ∈ [0, 1] is an element of a sequence νi(pii(βµ)) = {νi,k(pii,k(β, µ))}Kk=1,
and is computed as the weights ηi,k(·) in Definition 11, by substituting each ηji,k(·) by νi,k(·), the
risk function ρji,k(·) by the premium pii,k(·), and the size of the sequence m¯ki by K.
The premium of (β, µ) ∈ S to player i is the weighted sum of the premia in every Γ(k) ∈ Γ.
Hence, we define the process of equilibrium selection of player i as a problem of minimization of
that premium, such that,
min
(β,µ)∈S
pii(β, µ)
s.t. τi(pii(β, µ)) +
∑
j 6=i
τj(pij(β, µ)) ≤ τi(pii(β′, µ′)) +
∑
j 6=i
τj(pij(β
′, µ′)),∀(β′, µ′) ∈ S
pii(β, µ), ∀(β, µ) ∈ S .
(2)
The function τi : [0, y)→ [0,∞) is concave with τi(x) = 0 in x ∈ {0, y}, y ∈ (0,∞), and Dτi(x) = 0
in a unique point x∗ ∈ (0, y), where D is a differential operator. For the reasons in Silva (2019),
we can just focus on the global selection problem,
min
(β,µ)∈S
∑
i∈N
τi(pii(β, µ))
s.t. τi(pii(β, µ)), ∀(β, µ) ∈ S , ∀i ∈ N.
(3)
We write pi(β, µ) =
∑
i∈N τi(pii(β, µ)), and call it the aggregate premium of (β, µ) ∈ S . The
solutions of the problem in Equation (3) are consequently the solutions of G.
Definition 17 (Solution).
Let arg min(β,µ)∈S pi(β, µ) = s; then s =
∏
i∈N si is the set of the solutions of G.
The set s is trivially nonempty. One alternative to this process of selection would be the definition
of minimization problem in Equation (3) in each Γ(k). If we would write the solution of each Γ(k)
as sk, we could define the solution of G as the set s =
⋂K
k=1 sk. The caveat is that s may be empty;
the reason is the dependency of the selection procedure on the payoff cardinality. Therefore, we
opt for a a procedure whose solution minimizes the weighted average of the risk of a sequential
equilibrium in the different auxiliary games, thus reflecting the different stages of interim reasoning.
Considering pi(·), we now define a binary relation %pi over S .
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Definition 18 (Global preferences).
There is a binary relation %pi over S , such that, for any (β, µ), (β′, µ′) ∈ S , (β, µ) is globally
preferred to (β′, µ′), which we write (β, µ) %pi (β′, µ′), if pi(β, µ) ≤ pi(β′, µ′).
The binary relation %pi is a total order over S (see Proposition 3 in Silva (2019)). The conditions
for the uniqueness of a solution in G are analogous to those in static games, and the same holds as
to the class in which almost all games have a unique solution (see Proposition 4 in Silva (2019)).
3.3 Structure and Symmetry
In this section, we check if the existence of symmetries between elements of the game has any effect
on the process of equilibrium selection; we determine that by checking for the invariance of a solution
to isomorphic transformations of the extensive-form. In strategic-form games, the definition of an
isomorphism follows from Harsanyi and Selten (1988), which is unique and unambiguous; however,
in extensive-form games that is not the case. In particular, the literature distinguishes between two
main concepts. The first one is the concept of strong isomorphism (Peleg, Rosenmu¨ller, & Sudho¨lter,
1999), which corresponds to a bijective mapping between the sets of nodes of two extensive-form
games, while preserving the order of the moves.
Definition 19 (Strong isomorphism).
A strong isomorphism between games G =
〈
X,, N,W, (Xi, Hi, Ai, ui)i∈N , p
〉
and G˜ =
〈
X˜,
, N˜ , W˜ , (X˜i, H˜i, A˜i, u˜i)i∈N , p˜
〉
is a bijection φ : G→ G˜ which satisfies the following properties:
(A) For every x, x′ ∈ X, if x′  x, then φ(x′)  φ(x);
(B) There exists a bijection t : N → N˜ ;
(C) φ(Xi) = X˜t(i) and φ(Hi) = H˜t(i) for every i ∈ N ;
(D) φ(W ) = W˜ and px0(x) = pφ(x0)
(
φ(x)
)
for every x0 ∈W and x  x0;
(E) If C(hi) =
⋃
x∈hi C(x), then C
(
φ(hi)
)
=
⋃
φ(x)∈φ(hi)C
(
φ(x)
)
. Hence, there is a bijection
t : A → A˜, such that t(Ai(hi)) = A˜t(i)
(
φ(h)t(i)
)
and t(Ai(x)) = A˜t(i)
(
φ(x)
)
for every i ∈ N
and h ∈ H;
(F) ut(i)
(
φ(z)
)
= θiui(z) + ϑi, for z ∈ Z, in which θi > 0 and ϑi ∈ R are constants.
55
Condition (A) implies that the trees of two isomorphic games are isomorphic. Condition (B)
renames the players, and conditions (C) and (D) imply that the set of nodes and the information
sets of each player are mapped onto those of a single player in G˜, and that the initial nodes controlled
by Nature are independent of that transformation if they have the same probability distribution
on both G and G˜. By condition (E), the actions are mapped jointly with the nodes. In the last
condition, since φ(Z) = Z˜, the preferences of a player in G are mapped onto the preferences of a
single player in G˜, whose payoffs are a positive affine transformation of those in G. We provide in
Figure 2 an example of a strong isomorphism.
1
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(3, 7)
C
(8, 4)
D
A
2
(1, 1)
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(4, 8)
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B
1
2
(1, 1)
E
(4, 8)
F
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2
(3, 7)
C
(8, 4)
D
A
Figure 2: Game G (left), and game G˜ (right) following a strong isomorphism.
Because this isomorphism preserves the order of the moves, we cannot successfully apply this
transformation to every dynamic game; it does not preserve strategic symmetries when common
to both the strategic and the extensive-form representations. Hence, it is incompatible with the
existence of multiple extensive-form representations of a strategic-form game. To overcome this
issue, Peleg, Rosenmu¨ller, and Sudho¨lter (2000) propose an alternative concept, which they apply
to the canonical extensive-form of a game. In this representation, a chance mechanism selects,
without the players’ awareness, one among multiple possible extensive-form representations of a
game, thus connecting a player’s sets of nodes and information sets of each representation. This
concept guarantees the representation of symmetries, but increases the complexity of the game
representation, which is less intuitive, and of the isomorphic transformation. A sensible alternative
to it is the concept of weak isomorphism (Casajus, 2001). It is based on Selten (1983) notion
of symmetry in two-player extensive-form games, corresponding to a bijective mapping between
actions instead of nodes. In comparison to a strong isomorphisms, it just keeps the the strategical
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content of the order of moves, to what he calls its essential extent; consequently, that allows to
preserve the equilibria of the game. This transformation is especially sensible if we do not regard
the sequence of moves as being a real one.
Denote a path as (x) = {x, x′ ∈ X |x′  x, x′ ∈ X\W}, which contains x and all preceding
nodes with exception of the initial one. Take a((z)) = {a ∈ A | a ∈ A(x), x ∈ (z)} as the set of
the actions that lead to z, and whose path is (z).
Definition 20 (Weak isomorphism).
A weak isomorphism between two games G =
〈
X,, N,W, (Xi, Hi, Ai, ui)i∈N , p
〉
and G˜ =
〈
X˜,
, N˜ , W˜ , (X˜i, H˜i, A˜i, u˜i)i∈N , p˜
〉
is a bijection ϕ : G→ G˜ satisfying the following properties:
(a) There are bijections t1 : N → N˜ , t2 : H → H˜, t3 : W → W˜ , and t4 : Z → Z˜;
(b) ϕ(A(h)) = A˜(t2(h)), ϕ(Ai) = A˜t1(i), ϕ(A(x0)) = A˜(t
3(x0)), for every i ∈ N , h ∈ H, x0 ∈W ;
(c) If px0(x) = p(a), then p(a) = p(ϕ(a)), where a ∈ A(x0);
(d) ϕ(a((z))) = a˜((t4(z))) for every z ∈ Z;
(e) ut(i)(t
4(z)) = θiui(z) + ϑi, for z ∈ Z, in which θi > 0 and ϑi ∈ R are constants.
Comparing both isomorphisms, condition (e) is equivalent to condition (F), while conditions (b),
and (c) correspond to conditions (C) and (D). The bijections in condition (a) are equivalent to
condition (B) and to the bijection φ, while condition (E) is related to the bijection ϕ. The difference
between the isomorphisms lies in conditions (A) and (d). The latter condition requires plays given
by a set of certain actions in G to map to plays given by specific actions in G˜; thus, it requires a
path to contain the same actions leading to z, but not necessarily in the same order, as condition
(A) requires. In Figure 3 we give an example of a weak isomorphism.
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Figure 3: The games G (left), and G˜ (right) following a weak isomorphism.
According to Casajus (2001, Corollaries 3.4.1 and 3.4.2), both a weak and a strong isomorphism
are equivalent under certain game path conditions. In a later work, Casajus (2006) further relaxes
the latter concept, which he calls a super weak isomorphism. In that case, the isomorphism is
independent of the distribution over the initial nodes, and of the assignment of payoffs to terminal
nodes. He shows that such isomorphism preserves the set of sequential equilibria, and it is equivalent
to an isomorphism of the agent-normal form for a larger number of games than a weak isomorphism.
In general dynamic games, the sequence of moves may have some importance. However, given
the complexity of the analysis of games in canonical form, for simplicity, we pair the analysis of the
effect of a strong and a weak isomorphism on the mechanism of selection. We start with the effect
of the former type of isomorphism on %ρi,k in Γ(k).
Proposition 1.
%ρi,k in every Γ(k) ∈ Γ is invariant to a strong isomorphism φ.
As for the effect of a weak isomorphism on %ρi , we start by noticing that the order of moves is
not preserved, in the sense of Definition 19. However, according to Casajus (2001, theorem 3.3.7.),
this isomorphism still preserves the set of sequential equilibria. In that case, we say that the
isomorphism preserves the order of moves to its essential extent. We notice that this approach
inverts the standard paradigm in equilibrium analysis, since an equilibrium validates the concept,
and not the other way around.
Proposition 2.
%ρi,k in every Γ(k) ∈ Γ is invariant to a weak isomorphism ϕ.
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Considering the invariance properties of %ρi,k in each Γ(k), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
pi is invariant to a strong isomorphism φ and weak isomorphism ϕ.
We have shown in Proposition 1 and 2 that %ρi,k is invariant to both types of isomorphism in every
Γ(k). We have not done the same with respect to %wi,k. However, such property follows from %wi,k
being induced by a utility factor in each Γ(k). Hence, also pi(·) is invariant to those isomorphisms,
since such relation is a combination of the risk and the equilibrium payoff weight in each auxiliary
game.
3.4 Strategic equivalence
We conclude this section with a discussion on the sensitivity of pi and s to elementary operations
of the extensive-form of a game. We aim at verifying if the solutions in the extensive-form and
strategic-form representations of a game necessarily coincide.
The elementary operations - inflate-deflate, addition of a superfluous node, coalescing of in-
formation sets, and interchange of moves - proposed by Thompson (1952), when applied in the
correct order, transform the extensive-form game into its reduced normal-form. For that reason,
according to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), the latter type of representation is sufficient for the
analysis of a game. However, that conclusion is arguable. On the one hand, the set of sequential
equilibria is not invariant to some elementary operations. On the other hand, two of these opera-
tions - inflation-deflation and the addition of a superfluous decision node - may eliminate perfect
recall. For the latter reason, we focus on the elementary operations proposed by Elmes and Reny
(1994) - interchange of decision nodes, coalescing of information sets, and addition of superfluous
decision nodes - which preserve perfect recall11. We properly characterize each of these operations
in Appendix A.2
We obtain that pi and s are not independent of a transformation of the extensive-form representa-
tion of a game into its reduced normal-form because they are sensitive to one particular elementary
operation.
11There are other approaches in the strategic equivalence literature in extensive-form games, which are still relevant,
such as Bonanno (1992) transformation between games in set-theoretical and extensive forms, and Hoshi and Isaac
(2010) extension of Thompson (1952) transformations to games with unawareness.
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Proposition 3.
pi is not invariant to the coalescing of information sets.
We do not prove it here, but we could show that pi is invariant to the other two elementary opera-
tions. Regarding the interchange of decision nodes, the invariance follows from pi being invariant
to a weak isomorphism. Concerning the addition of superfluous decision nodes, the invariance of pi
follows from such operation not changing the number of actions, behavioral strategies, and game
tree levels.
4 The Spence signaling game
We now apply the selection method to the most basic version of Spence (1973) job market signaling
game, in which there are only two types of worker (high and low productive types). We have chosen
an application to this model for several reasons. On the one hand, it is a game with economic
meaning, which compensates for more abstract games, as the ones we provide in Silva (2019). On
the other hand, the structure of the game is simple, and we do not need to make many modifications
on the method to general extensive-form games. Its mathematical structure is common to other
economic signaling models, which would allow to extrapolate some arguments and conclusions to
those models.
4.1 Notation and equilibria
In a general extensive-form game, players select one or more sequential equilibria as the solutions
of the game. In a signaling game, however, a player’s strategy and payoff, hence the respective
deviations and losses in utility, depend on the type representing him in the game. We assume, as in
Harsanyi (1995b), that the various types of each i ∈ N in a signaling game are those who actually
select a solution; hence, the strategies and the payoffs of a player, and naturally his deviations, are
the strategies and payoffs of his types.
The most simple version of Spence’s signaling game has one worker, which is one of possible
θ = {H,L} types. The player’s type determines his productivity, such that H > L > 0; we assume
that L is high enough for every game payoff to be nonnegative. A chance move determines the
player’s type, such that, with prior probability p he is of type H, and with probability 1− p he is
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of type L. The worker moves first by choosing a level of education e ∈ [0,∞). Two risk-neutral
firms, upon observing the education choice e, simultaneously offer a wage r ∈ [0,∞) in a Bertrand
competition regime. If both firms offer the same wage, the worker decides which offer to take
according to the result of a fair coin toss. The payoff of a firm who does not attract the worker is
zero; it is θ − r if the firm attracts a worker of type θ. A type θ payoff is r − (e/θ), where (e/θ) is
the disutility of education. In equilibrium, the firms bid the expected productivity of the worker,
such that,
E(θ|e) =
∑
θ={H,L}
µ(θ|e)θ, e ∈ [0,∞),
where µ(·|e) is the firm’s belief about the worker’s type upon observing his level of education choice.
This game has three categories of sequential equilibrium. The first one contains separating
equilibria, where different types of worker choose different levels of education, and each firm, upon
correctly identifying the type, proposes wages matching the types’ productivity. The level of educa-
tion supporting a separating equilibrium is e∗ ∈ [e1, e2], where e1 > 0 is the lowest level of education
satisfying H − (e∗/L) ≤ L, and e2 > e1 the highest level of education satisfying H − (e∗/H) ≥ L.
Each firm believes that an education level e < e∗ signals a type L, and e ≥ e∗ a type H. Type
L chooses an education level e0 = 0, and obtains a payoff L; type H chooses an education level
e∗, and his payoff is H − (e∗/H). The incentive constraints which avoid a deviation by any of the
types are for type L,
H − e
∗
L
≤ L,
and for type H,
H − e
∗
H
≥ L.
In the second category we include pooling equilibria. In this case, both types L and H pool in a
level of education ep. Since the firms cannot identify their types, they offer a wage that corresponds
to the worker’s prior expected productivity pH + (1− p)L. Several systems of beliefs support this
equilibrium; for instance, one system implies that the firms consider any education level e 6= ep as
signal of a type L. The worker’s types do not have an incentive to deviate, in this case, if
pH + (1− p)L− e
p
θ
≥ L.
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There are multiple pooling equilibria in which types pool in ep ∈ [0, b] with b ≥ 0, since a firm’s
beliefs are not restricted off-the-equilibrium path.
The third category includes the hybrid equilibria, in which one or both types randomize between
pooling or separating levels of education. An example of a hybrid equilibrium has type L separating,
and type H randomizing. Hence, the former type chooses an education level e = 0, while the latter
one randomizes between e = 0 with probability q, and an education level e∗ with probability 1− q.
The firm’s posterior probability that the worker’s type is H, given e = 0, by the Bayes rule, is
qp
qp+ (1− p) .
The firm’s offer a wage,
r =
qp
qp+ (1− p)H +
1− p
qp+ (1− p)L.
Type H is indifferent between education levels e = 0 and e∗ if
qp
qp+ (1− p)H +
1− p
qp+ (1− p)L−
e∗(1− q)
H
= H − e
∗
H
. (4)
One system of beliefs that supports this equilibrium has the firms believing that any level of
education e′ < e∗ signals a type L, while a level of education e′′ > e∗ leads to the update of the
posterior probabilities of the worker being type L or H.
4.2 Solutions
Denote a separating equilibrium as (e0, e
∗; rs) where e∗ ∈ [e1, e2], a pooling equilibrium as (ep, ep; rp)
with ep ∈ [0, b], and a hybrid equilibrium as (βL(e), βH(e); rh)12.
Because there is an infinite number of equilibria, we select a solution by seeking for an equilib-
rium which is dominant over all others for both types of worker according to the criterion of risk
and payoff dominance. To simplify the analysis, due to the heavy notation of the model, we assume
that the productivity of the types is H = 2 and L = 1. In van Damme and Gu¨th (1991) application
of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) selection model to this same version of the Spence signaling game,
they assume instead that H = 1 and L = 0. In comparison, we apply an affine transformation of
12For simplification, we do not identify the system of beliefs supporting the equilibrium assessment.
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these productivity levels; otherwise the utility functions are not continuous everywhere. Hence, we
obtain that e1 = 1, and e2 = 2. The intuition for this setup is that type H is fully productive, while
L is completely unproductive. Following the application of the selection mechanism, we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 4.
The Spence signaling game has the following solutions:
• if p > 1/2, the pooling equilibrium (ep, ep; rp) with ep = 0 and firms’ beliefs that any e 6= ep
signals a type L;
• if p ≤ 1/2, the separating equilibrium (e0, e∗; rs) with e∗ = e1.
We present the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix A.3.. This result only supports Cho and
Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion prediction in the interval of the prior distribution p ∈ [0, 1/2].
The importance of this prior was also addressed in van Damme and Gu¨th (1991). In that case,
however, the predictions are different, since they support the pooling equilibrium (ep, ep; rp), in
which ep = 0, as the solution of the game if the prior probability p ≤ 1/2, and the separating
equilibrium (e0, e
∗; rs), in which e∗ = e1, if p > 1/2. They do not provide any economic intuition
for the result; but they point that some of the sensibility of that result derives from the solution
corresponding to Wilson (1977) E2-equilibrium, that is, a sequential equilibrium that is the best
outcome for type H13. However, it is not explicitly stated what is meant by being the best to type
H. Nevertheless, our solution not only is the one that maximizes the expected payoff of type H
in each of those intervals in the prior distribution, but it is also not possible to further improve
neither his payoff nor the payoff of type L with the introduction of new contracts.
We can also provide some intuition for the result in Proposition 4. In both cases, BL = {βL(0)},
where βL(0) = 1, meaning that type L always chooses an education level of zero, and cannot
enforce the selection of any particular equilibrium. Therefore, in both cases, type H selects his
most preferred equilibrium. When p > 1/2, type H maximizes his expected payoff by participating
of a pooling equilibrium, and when p ≤ 1/2, the maximization of his payoff occurs in a separating
13We can describe E2-equilibrium as a solution in which it is not possible to add any more contracts to the game,
which are profitable, after all contracts that induce losses are eliminated from the set of contracts offered to the
worker.
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equilibrium. The idea, in the former case, is that when firms’ have a high prior on a worker being
high productive, type H’s incentive to invest in education is low, as it becomes less important to
signal his type. In the latter case, however, as the prior puts less mass on a type being highly
productive, type H’s maximization of the expected payoff depends on differentiation, which implies
an investment on education to signal his type.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we extend Silva (2019) selection method from static to dynamic games, in which
asymmetries of information are possible. The assumptions underlying the methods in both types
of game are similar. The process of selection, however, differs, since in dynamic games we take
into account the sequential nature of decision-making. Consequently, as we show Proposition 3,
the solution of a game in extensive-form does not necessarily coincide with the solution in its
respective reduced normal-form. The remaining properties, such as the invariance to the existence
of symmetries between elements of the game, and the existence and uniqueness of a solution, also
hold in this version of the method.
From the application of the method to Spence’s signaling model we obtain a result partially
concordant with Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion, when the prior probability of the worker
being type H is p ≤ 1/2; however, it contradicts the prediction from van Damme and Gu¨th (1991)
application of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Our result mainly follows from type L not having any
mean to enforce a particular equilibrium among those that are eligible for selection, since it is
optimal for him to choose a null level of education. In that case, it is sensible to just focus on
the choices of type H, which aim at maximizing his own expected payoff. That argument partially
extends the equilibrium dominance criterion in Cho and Kreps (1987), justifying the match between
our solution and the intuitive criterion for a given interval of the prior probability. With more than
two types of worker, we conjecture that hybrid equilibria may play a more important role. We also
believe that in that case, separation may also arise as a more likely solution, given the increase
in importance of the criterion of risk-dominance. These are some questions that we intend to
investigate in future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A.1
Proof of Proposition 1.
We first show that the set δi,k(β, µ) from (β, µ) ∈ S by i ∈ N is independent of a strong isomor-
phism. It then follows that ρi,k(·) also satisfies that property.
From condition (D), both W and the family of probability distributions p are independent of
a strong isomorphism φ. By condition (C), the sets Xi and Hi of each i ∈ N are mapped onto
the sets of t(i) ∈ t(N), which by condition (E) it also carries the feasible actions Ai(hi) at each
hi ∈ Hi. Condition (A) implies that the sequence of moves is the same. Hence, there is a bijection
g : B → B˜, such that g(Bi) = B˜t(i) for every i ∈ N . By condition (A), the order of moves leading
to any z ∈ Z is kept, and by condition (F) the payoff of such outcome to t(i) ∈ t(N) is the
same. Therefore, λ(·) from each deviation is the same. Therefore, we can propose another bijection
g′ : δk(β, µ) → δk(β˜, µ˜), such that, g′(δi,k(β, µ)) = δt(i),k(β˜, µ) for every i ∈ N , (β, µ) ∈ S , and
Γ(k) ∈ Γ. Since we prove the invariance of ρi,k(·) to an affine transformation of the utility function
in Silva (2019), we conclude that %ρi,k is invariant to φ. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
According to Casajus (2001, theorem 3.3.7.), a weak isomorphism ϕ preserves the set S . We have
seen that between a weak and strong isomorphism, only conditions (A) and (f) were not equivalent;
those conditions concern the order of moves. In ϕ, considering player i’s deviations δi,k(β, µ) from
(β, µ) ∈ S in Γ(k), we can propose a bijection g′′ : δi,k(β, µ) → δt1(i),k(β, µ), such that, the
deviations and respective losses from a sequential equilibrium are independent of the order of the
moves. Therefore, ρi,k(β, µ) = ρt1(i),k(β˜, µ). Since ρi,k(·) is independent of an affine transformation
of the payoff function in each Γ(k) ∈ Γ, then we conclude that %ρi,k is independent of ϕ. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
According to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), the set S is not invariant to the coalescing of infor-
mation sets. That would suffice to justify why pi is not invariant to that operation. However, we
can show that the selection method, and not only its set of arguments, is affected by this operation.
Assume that pi is invariant to the coalescing of information sets, given as a mapping OC : G→ G′.
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Denote as SG and SG′ the sets of sequential equilibria in G and G
′, such that, SG = SG′ , and
SG ⊆ S , and whereS is the set of all the sequential equilibria ofG which exist or not inG′. LetpiG
and piG′ be total orders over SG and SG′ , which are equivalent, i.e., for every (β, µ), (β′, µ′) ∈ SG,
if (β, µ) piG (β′, µ′), then (β, µ) piG′ (β′, µ′). By definition, piG(β, µ) ≤ piG(β′, µ′) in G for every
(β, µ), (β′, µ′) ∈ SG, which is equivalent to
∑
i∈N τi(pi
G
i (β, µ)) ≤
∑
i∈N τi(pi
G
i (β
′, µ′)). Write the
premium of a sequential equilibrium to player i in G′ as piG′i (·). Assume that G has K levels, and
that G′ just has K − 1 levels; at some level k in G, we have Xk = Xi,k, and the nodes in Xi,k are
coalesced into Xi,k+1. Hence, for each j 6= i, we have piGj (β, µ) 6= piG
′
j (β, µ), since the weights of
the premium induced by (β, µ) in each auxiliary game of G and G′ are νGj (pii(βµ)) 6= νG
′
j (pii(βµ)),
and as long piGi,k(β, µ) 6= 0. It is then not possible to guarantee that piG(β, µ) ≤ piG(β′, µ′) holds for
every (β, µ), (β′, µ′) ∈ SG in G′, which concludes the proof. 
Appendix A.2
An elementary operation is a transformation O : G → G′ of the extensive-form representation of
G, where G =
〈
X,, N,W,H,A, u, p〉 and G′ = 〈X ′,, N ′,W ′, H ′, A′, u′, p′〉. Let F (x) = {x˜ ∈
X | x˜  x} be the set of all successor nodes of x. Denote the continuation game of G at node x as
Gx, which contains a set of nodes F (x) ∪ {x}, while the remaining of its structure is adjusted to
the set of nodes (i.e., information sets, actions, and payoffs). We start with the definition of the
interchange of decision nodes.
Definition 21 (Interchange of decision nodes).
The interchange of decision nodes is mapping OI : G → G′, where for nodes x, x1, x2, x3, x4,
x5, x6 ∈ X\W ∪ Z:
(a) C(x) = {x1, x2}, C(x1) = {x3, x4}, and C(x2) = {x5, x6}; h(x1) = h(x2); A(x3) = A(x5)
and A(x4) = A(x6);
(b) For every xˆ ∈ X\{x1, x2}, C(xˆ) = C ′(xˆ), while C ′(x1) = [C(x1) ∪ {x5}]\{x4} and C ′(x2) =[
C(x2) ∪ {x4}]\{x5};
(c) For every xˆ /∈ h(x) ∪ h(x1), we have h′(xˆ) = h(xˆ) and ι′(xˆ) = ι(xˆ). We have h′(x) =
{h(x1) ∪ {x}}\{x1, x2} and h′(x1) = {h(x) ∪ {x1, x2}}\{x}, while for every xˆ ∈ h′(x) and
x˜ ∈ h′(x1), we have ι′(xˆ) = ι(x1) and ι′(x˜) = ι(x);
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(d) A′(x1) = A(x) and A′(x) = A(x2);
(e) G =
〈
X\F (x) ∪ {x},≺, N, ι,W,H,A, p〉 and G′ = 〈X ′\F ′(x) ∪ {x},≺, N ′, ι′,W ′, H ′, A′, p′〉
are strongly isomorphic;
(f) For every xˆ ⊀ x1 or xˆ ⊀ x2, Gxˆ and G′xˆ are strongly isomorphic.
Point (a) describes the organization of the nodes in G, and point (b) how they relate with the nodes
in G′. Point (c) implies that the information of a player does not change with OI , and point (d)
that the actions change according with a change in the nodes. Points (e) and (f) guarantee that
the game remains the same in nodes not affected by OI . In Figure 3, we have an example of this
operation. The second elementary operation is the coalescing of information sets.
Definition 22 (Coalescing of information sets).
Take h(xi) = {x1, . . . , xn} and h(xˆi) = {xˆ1, . . . , xˆn}; the coalescing of information sets is a mapping
OC : G→ G′, in which:
(A) ι(xi) = ι(xˆi) for i = 1, . . . , n;
(B) xˆi ∈ C(xi);
(C) G′ is strongly isomorphic to G =
〈
X\{xˆ1, . . . , xˆn},, N, ι,H,A, u, p〉.
Points (A) and (B) describe the organization of the nodes, and point (C) indicate that we merge
two consecutive nodes into a single one. We depict in Figure 4 an example of this operation.
1
(4, 2)
A
1
(0, 0)
C
(0, 2)
D
B
1
(4, 2)
A
(0, 0)
BC
(0, 2)
BD
Figure 4: Game G (left) and game G′ (right) following the coalescing of information sets.
The third elementary operation is the addition of superfluous decision nodes, which in the current
form, and contrarily to Thompson (1952), preserves perfect recall.
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Definition 23 (Addition of superfluous decision nodes).
The addition of superfluous decision nodes {x1, . . . , xn} to G is a mapping OA : G→ G′, such that,
for nodes {x1,1, . . . , x1,m, . . . , xn,1, . . . , xn,m}, in which i, j = 1, . . . , n and k, ` = 1, . . . ,m:
1. For every x′ ∈ h(xi), x′Rp = h(xi) = h(xj);
2. C(xi) = {xi,1, . . . , xi,m};
3. Γxi,k and Γxi,` are strongly isomorphic for every x
i,k, xi,` ∈ C(xi);
4. A(xi,k) = A(xj,k);
5. If x  xi,k and x  xi,`, and we have h(x) = h(x), xˆ ∈ C(x), xˆ ∈ C(x), and xˆ = φ(xˆ), then
A(xˆ) = A(xˆ);
6. If ι(x) 6= ι(xi), and x  xi,k, then h(φ(x)) = h(x); if ι(x) = ι(xi), and x  xi,k, xˆ  xj,k,
then: (i) when x¯ ∈ h(x) then x¯  x`,k, for ` = 1, . . . , n; (ii) when x¯ ∈ h(φ(x)) then x¯  x`,q
for ` = 1, . . . , n and q = 1, . . . ,m; (iii) h(x) = h(xˆ) if and only if h(φ(x)) = h(φ(xˆ));
7. G =
〈
Xxi ,≺, N, ι,H,Axi , u, p
〉
and G′ are strongly isomorphic, such that Xxi = [X\{x |x 
xi}] ∪ {xˆ | xˆ  xi,k}, for i = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . ,m, and Axi is the set of available actions
at each xi ∈ Xxi.
By point 1, we preserve perfect recall. From each successor of an added node following point 2,
we obtain subgames that are mutually isomorphic (point 3), while ensuring that a player with
additional nodes has the same available actions as before (point 4). Points 5 and 6 imply that the
players who did not receive additional nodes have the same choices and information as before, and
that those who do have additional nodes also have the same information as before. Point 7 implies
that G is strongly isomorphic to various parts of G′. We provide an example of this transformation
in Figure 5.
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1(4, 2)
A
2
(0, 0)
C
(0, 2)
D
B
1
(4, 2)
C
(4, 2)
D
A
(0, 0)
C
(0, 2)
D
B
2
Figure 5: Games G (left) and game G′ (right) following the addition of a superfluous decision node.
Appendix A.3
Lemma 1.
The equilibrium (e0, e1; r
s) is the separating equilibrium with the lowest premium.
Proof. Consider any separating equilibrium where type H chooses e′ > e1. That equilibrium is
payoff dominated for type H, since H − (e1/H) > H − (e′/H). The risk of each separating
equilibrium follows from the deviations of type L; given that in each of those equilibria, type
L plays e0, any deviation induces the same payoff loss in each equilibrium. Hence, ρH(·) is the
same in each equilibrium; we do not evaluate the risk for type L because this type cannot enforce
a specific separating equilibrium, since in every one it chooses e0. In this case, the criterion of
payoff-dominance acts as a tie-breaker, which concludes the proof.
Lemma 2.
The equilibrium (ep, ep; rp) in which ep = 0 and the firm’s system of beliefs are that any e 6= ep
signals a type L is the pooling equilibrium with the lowest premium.
Proof. There are multiple pooling equilibria with ep ∈ [0, b], where the firms’ belief system mainly
determines the set of deviations δθ(·) of each type θ, and thus λ(·)(βθ(·)). Concerning payoff-
dominance, the pooling equilibrium with ep = 0 is payoff-dominant for any type θ, since pH + (1−
p)L < pH + (1 − p)L − (e/θ) for any e > 0. The firms’ system of beliefs that induce the largest
losses to any type θ but which supports a pooling equilibrium with ep ∈ [0, b] considers that any
deviation to e 6= ep signals a type L. In that case, the payoff from a deviation by type θ is L− e/θ.
In pooling equilibria with either ep = 0 or ep = b, for each type θ, λ(0,0;rp)(βθ(e)) = λ(b,b;rp)(βθ(e))
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for every e 6= ep, where e ∈ δθ(0, 0; rp) and e ∈ δθ(b, b; rp). Hence, payoff-dominance determines if
we select the polling equilibrium with support on ep = 0 or ep = b, which concludes the proof.
Lemma 3.
The hybrid equilibria of the game are not eligible for selection.
Proof. Extending the reasoning of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to hybrid equilibria, we exclude mixtures
with support on separating and pooling levels of education not eligible for selection. We are left with
hybrid equilibria in which type H randomizes between separating and pooling levels of education,
and type L chooses an education level of zero. We describe such hybrid equilibrium in Section
4.1. Denote that semi-separating equilibrium as (0, βH(e); r
h). In that case, for both players,
(0, βH(e); r
h) ∼uθ (e0, e1; rs). If the firms’ beliefs imply that a deviation to e < σ(e) signals a type
L, then both types H and L have exactly the same relative payoff losses following an admissible
deviation in (0, βH(e); r
h) and (e0, e1; r
s). Hence, as we discuss in (Silva, 2019, Remark 1), the
hybrid equilibrium (0, βH(e); r
h) is not eligible for selection. Since this reasoning holds on a semi-
pooling equilibrium, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Following Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3, the set of equilibria eligible to selection contains the
separating equilibrium (e0, e1; r
s), and the pooling equilibrium (0, 0; rp). When the prior probability
p of the worker being type H is
p >
H − L− (e1/H)
H − L =
1
2
, (5)
the pooling equilibrium is payoff-dominant for type H and L, and thus the solution of the game.
Otherwise, it is the separating equilibrium, since only |BH | > 1, meaning that type H chooses, as
the solution of the game, the equilibrium that maximizes his expected payoff. 
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